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FEDERALISM AND POLITICAL COMPETITION
IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES
JONATHAN L. MARSHFIELD
ABSTRACT
Political competition is essential to the development and maintenance
of a healthy and stable democracy. Current scholarship has largely
ignored the role that federalism can play in fostering meaningful political
competition in emerging democracies. This Article aims to fill this void by
developing a theory of political competition within federal systems based
on a formal game theory model created by economist and Nobel Laureate
Roger B. Myerson. The Article argues that constructive political
competition is especially difficult in emerging democracies because social
and economic exigencies create strong incentives for new leadership to
quash opposition and because first-time voters do not have a point of
comparison by which to judge their first set of democratic leaders. Unitary
regimes exacerbate these problems because they create an all-or-nothing
political scenario and provide voters with only one point of political
comparison. Federal systems, on the other hand, create multiple political
arenas. This means that political opposition can be contained without
being quashed, and that voters will have multiple points of political
comparison. After exploring the necessary parameters of this model, the
Article then applies the model to post-apartheid South Africa, which has
been controlled by a single political party since the country’s first
democratic election in 1994. The Article concludes that South Africa’s
federal structure is gradually fostering constructive political competition
as the model suggests and that opposition parties in South Africa are well
situated to take further advantage of these opportunities in the future.
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INTRODUCTION
By all accounts, South Africa‘s negotiated transition from apartheid to
democracy was one of the great accomplishments of the twentieth
century.1 There are, however, reasons to be concerned about the stability
and maturity of South Africa‘s democracy. A primary concern is the
African National Congress‘s (ANC) stronghold on political life. 2 The
ANC is the only political party to have held national power since South
Africa‘s first democratic election in 1994. 3 In the three elections that have
been held since then, the ANC has never won less than sixty-six percent of
the national vote. 4
South Africa‘s experience is illustrative of a larger trend of one-party
dominance in emerging democracies. 5 Many societies that transition from
authoritarianism to democracy6 struggle to develop political cultures that
1. See Peter N. Bouckaert, Note, The Negotiated Revolution: South Africa’s Transition to a
Multiracial Democracy, 33 STAN. J. I NT‘ L L. 375, 375 (1997) (characterizing South Africa‘s transition
to democracy as ―one of the greatest political achievements of this century‖); see also Marianne Geula,
Note, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission as an Alternate Means of Addressing
Transitional Government Conflicts in a Divided Society, 18 B.U. I NT‘ L L.J. 57, 59–63 (2000)
(providing concise description of transition to democracy).
2. See Roger Southall, The ‘Dominant Party Debate’ in South Africa, 2005 AFR. SPECTRUM 61,
64–65 (summarizing concerns associated with ANC‘s dominance of post-apartheid democracy); Adam
Habib & Rupert Taylor, Parliamentary Opposition & Democratic Consolidation in South Africa, 26
REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 261, (1999) (discussing relationship between democratic stability and ANC
political dominance).
3. Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, Results, http://www.elections.org.za
(click ―Elections‖; then ―Results‖) (last visited Feb. 28, 2011) [hereinafter IEC Results] (providing
official election results for all of South Africa‘s post-apartheid elections); see also Norbert Kersting,
Voting Behaviour in the 2009 South African Election, 2009 AFR. SPECTRUM 125 (summarizing ANC‘s
dominance since 1994).
4. IEC Results, supra note 3. The ANC won 63% of the national vote in 1994, 66% in 1999,
70% in 2004, and 66% in 2009. Id.
5. See Hermann Giliomee & Charles Simkins, The Dominant Party Regimes of South Africa,
Mexico, Taiwan and Malaysia: A Comparative Assessment, in THE AWKWARD EMBRACE: ONE -PARTY
DOMINATION AND DEMOCRACY 1 (Hermann Giliomee & Charles Simkins eds., 1999) (discussing
general trend of one-party dominance in emerging democracies and specifically discussing Mexico,
Malaysia, Taiwan, and South Africa); see also ADAM PRZEWORSKI ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND
DEVELOPMENT 59–69 (2000) (listing countries that have experienced one-party dominance
notwithstanding democratic elections including, among others, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Egypt,
Gambia, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Senegal, South Africa, Honduras, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Mongolia,
Pakistan, and Turkey).
6. Following Samuel P. Huntington, this Article uses the term ―authoritarianism‖ to refer to any
form of government that is non-democratic. See SAMUEL P. H UNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE:
DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 11–13 (1991). Following Joseph A.
Schumpeter, democracy refers to ―that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in
which individuals acquire power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people‘s vote.‖
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269 (2d ed. 1947); see also
HUNTINGTON, supra, at 6–10 (explaining why Schumpeter‘s procedural definition of democracy is
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support loyal opposition and constructive political competition. 7 This trend
is troubling because political competition is inextricably linked with
democratic stability. Mature, stable democracies almost universally exhibit
vibrant two-party or multi-party political systems. 8 Indeed, democratic
theorists generally agree that ―a functioning political opposition is
essential to democracy.‖9
Yet, emerging democracies face significant obstacles to loyal political
opposition.10 Social, economic, and political exigencies associated with
dramatic political transition can create strong incentives for the firstelected party to consolidate power and quash opposition. 11 An additional,
best for purposes of classification and comparative analysis). As used in this Article, ―emerging
democracy‖ refers to a country that is transitioning or has recently transitioned from authoritarianism
to democracy. See Stathis N. Kalyvas, Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of
Religious Parties, 32 COMP. POL., 379 (2000) (using the term similarly).
7. See Giliomee & Simkins, supra note 5, at 2–3 (arguing that many dominant-party systems
occur ―on the heels‖ of revolution or political transition of some kind). This trend was widely observed
during the democratization of the former Soviet Union. See Peter C. Ordeshook, Constitutions,
Elections, and Election Law, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1603–06 (2009).
8. See AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: G OVERNMENT FORMS AND
PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES 76–77 (1999) [hereinafter LIJPHART, G OVERNMENT FORMS
AND PERFORMANCE] (listing party ratios for thirty-six democracies between 1945 and 1996); AREND
LIJPHART, DEMOCRACIES: PATTERNS OF MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT IN TWENTYONE COUNTRIES 106–26 (1984) [hereinafter LIJPHART, MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS
GOVERNMENT] (listing party ratios for twenty-two democracies between 1945 and 1980). Political
parties are not a necessary condition for democracy. PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 5, at 20 n.8.
However, modern democratic competition is generally structured around political parties. Id at 20.
More important, in systems where at least one party exists, political competition depends on the
existence of a viable opposition party. Id. Thus, one-party states are generally indicative of a lack of
meaningful political competition. Id.
9. Courtney Jung & Ian Shapiro, South Africa’s Negotiated Transition: Democracy, Opposition,
and the New Constitutional Order, 23 POL. & SOC‘Y 269, 272 (1995). Many theorists go further and
claim that a democracy is not fully consolidated until there has been at least one peaceful transfer of
power to an opposition party following the initial transition to democracy. See, e.g., H UNTINGTON,
supra note 6, at 266–67 (articulating now famous ―two-turnover‖ test for democratic consolidation);
ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN
EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 10 (1991) (―Democracy is a system in which parties lose
elections . . . .‖).
10. ―Loyal opposition‖ refers to political opposition that recognizes a distinction between
opposition to extant leadership and opposition to the underlying political order. See HUNTINGTON,
supra note 6, at 261–62. Within a democracy, loyal opposition may oppose a particular party or leader,
but it must nevertheless recognize democratic processes as the legitimate means for resolving political
conflict. See Barrington Moore, Jr., Liberal Prospects under Soviet Socialism: A Comparative
Historical Perspective, in MORAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND OTHER ESSAYS 82, 84–91
(1998) (defining ―loyal opposition‖ and tracing its roots to monarchal regimes).
11. Government performance is critically important for young democracies to survive. Emerging
democracies have a small window of opportunity to demonstrate their efficacy. Democracies that fail
to deliver basic public services and economic growth tend to fail. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at
258–61. These circumstances create strong incentives for quashing political opposition. See Giliomee
& Simkins, supra note 5, at xii; infra Part II.A (discussing this problem in more detail). Emerging
democracies also face a crisis of regime loyalty. They are faced with residual supporters of
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and perhaps more universal, obstacle to political competition in emerging
democracies concerns the peculiar circumstances facing first-time voters.
Within mature democracies there are typically many political leaders that
have established reputations for using political power within constitutional
constraints and for the public good.12 Voters therefore have the ability to
make real comparisons between democratic leaders and their policy
platforms.13 Political track records provide voters with a means of
evaluating a candidate‘s propensity to adopt efficacious policies and a
credible basis to believe a candidate‘s promises. 14 These circumstances
create a competitive market for votes in which political track records are
the most valuable currency.15 Voters in emerging democracies are situated
in a fundamentally different political game. There are no established
leaders with credible reputations for democratic governance. 16 Thus,
voters have no real reference point against which to compare the
performance or policies of the first-elected government or any challengers.
Additionally, even if voters become dissatisfied with the first-elected
government, they have no reason to believe that an incumbent will
perform any better because incumbents cannot demonstrate their
credibility or competence by reference to an established track record. As a
result, many emerging democratic societies stifle political competition by
repeatedly re-electing bad leadership.17

authoritarianism. This creates incentives for new leaders to quash all opposition out of fear that any
opposition will undermine the new democratic order. See infra Part II.A (discussing this problem in
more detail).
12. Roger B. Myerson, Federalism and Incentives for Success of Democracy, 1 Q. J. POL. SCI. 1,
3–4 (2006).
13. Id.
14. This model of voter choice is not undisputed. See John Ferejohn, Incumbent Performance
and Electoral Control, 30 PUB. CHOICE 5 (1986) (arguing that a better model of voter choice is based
on voters as primarily forward looking). But see V.O. KEY, JR., THE RESPONSIBLE ELECTORATE:
RATIONALITY IN PRESIDENTIAL VOTING 1936–1960 (1966) (offering support for voter choice model
based on reputations); Jeffrey S. Banks & Rangarajan K. Sundaram, Optimal Retention in Agency
Problems, 82 J. ECON. THEORY 293 (1998) (same). More important than these disputes regarding
modeling, there is significant empirical evidence that voters do in fact rely on a candidate‘s past
reputation in making electoral choices. See generally MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN
AMERICAN N ATIONAL ELECTIONS (1981); Gerald H. Kramer, Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting
Behavior, 1896–1964, 65 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 131 (1971).
15. For classic economic models of voter activity along these lines see Gerald H. Kramer, A
Dynamic Model of Political Equilibrium, 16 J. ECON. THEORY 310 (1977) and Richard D. McKelvey,
Policy Related Voting and Electoral Equilibrium, 43 ECONOMETRICA 815 (1975).
16. See H. Kwasi Prempeh, Presidential Power in Comparative Perspective: The Puzzling
Persistence of Imperial Presidency in Post-Authoritarian Africa, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 761
(2008) (discussing the problems facing emerging democracies caused by inexperienced democratic
leadership).
17. See PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 5, at 25–27 (listing countries that have been caught in
this cycle at various times). The dynamics of this process are complex and multi-variant. See Myerson,
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Notwithstanding these serious problems facing emerging democracies,
there has been very little theoretical research exploring the ways in which
institutional design can foster constructive political competition. 18 Most
theoretical discussions simply assert that democracy is incompatible with
formal legal restraints on political opposition.19 While these negative
assertions are no doubt true, they do not address the more constructive
issue of how to design institutions that can counteract one-party
dominance by creating positive incentives for constructive political
competition in emerging democracies. 20 This Article takes up that
important but neglected question. It argues that well-designed federal
arrangements are one way to effectively counteract some of the obstacles
to political competition facing emerging democracies.
Federalism can facilitate political competition in at least two ways.
First, in a unitary system there is only one political arena. This means that
only one political party has the opportunity to develop a positive track
record at any given time, and, consequently, the first-elected party in an
emerging democracy has a monopoly on voters‘ expectations. In a federal
regime, however, there are multiple constitutionally protected political
arenas.21 Federalism creates the possibility that several different political
parties can develop political track records at the same time. This, in turn,
provides voters with points of comparison, and, consequently, creates a
competitive market for votes based on positive political track records. In
this way, the decentralization of political power by federal arrangement is
better suited to facilitate political competition than a unitary system. 22 In
economic terms, it can reduce opportunity costs associated with political
choice.

supra note 12, at 5–7. The claim here is only that a lack of political track records is one real problem
facing emerging democracies. Id.
18. See Jung & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 271 (noting absence of research in this area).
19. See, e.g., HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at 7–9. These can include legal restraints on political
association or the press, or direct and indirect manipulation of votes and voting districts. Id.
20. See Jung & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 273–75; Myerson, supra note 12, at 6 (noting that
literature on federalism considers effects of devolving policy-making authority to subnational units
and ignores role that federalism can play in providing incentives for democratic stability). Nobel
Laureate and economist Roger B. Myerson has developed a formal game theory model dealing with
federalism and incentives for non-corrupt governance. Id. Myerson‘s model relies on political
competition as a means of creating incentives for leaders to withstand corruption. Id. at 4–7. This
appears to be the only literature addressing the relationship between federalism and political
competition. The model developed here draws on Myerson‘s formal game theory model, but develops
a series of additional parameters that expand Myerson‘s model beyond his original application. See
infra Part III (discussing Myerson‘s model).
21. See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 107–09 (1987) (defining federalism as
legal arrangement that divides power between various spheres of government).
22. See infra Part III (developing and supporting this claim).
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Second, federalism is well suited to dealing with the incentives to
quash political opposition that appear in many emerging democracies.
First-elected leaders are under extreme pressure to address momentous
social problems quickly and effectively.23 This creates incentives for the
ruling party to remove impediments to swift government action, including
political opposition. Unitary regimes exacerbate this problem because they
create an all-or-nothing political scenario. By creating multiple spheres of
political authority, federalism creates new possibilities for compromise
and consensus between political groups.24 For example, certain contested
issues can be left undecided at the national level but delegated to
subnational government. This can make it easier for first-elected
governments to avoid political deadlocks and direct political confrontation
at the national level, thus mitigating the incentives to quash all
opposition.25
This is not to suggest that federalism can solve all exigencies facing
new democratic regimes. The more modest but nevertheless important
point is that unitary regimes create an all-or-nothing political scenario,
which creates incentives for the first-elected party to quash all opposition
and provides voters with only one point of political comparison. Federal
arrangements, on the other hand, create multiple political arenas. This
means that competition can be contained without being destroyed, and that
voters will, from time zero, have multiple points of political comparison.
In short, federalism can foster constructive political opposition because it
creates legally independent spheres of competition that operate
simultaneously.
After further extrapolating the necessary parameters of the above
model, this Article analyzes South Africa‘s federal structure to determine

23. See infra Part II.A.
24. See Jonathan L. Marshfield, Authorizing Subnational Constitutions in Transitional Federal
States: South Africa, Democracy, and the KwaZulu-Natal Constitution, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L.
585, 621–29 (2008) (explaining how South Africa‘s federal structure played this role during transition
from apartheid to democracy). Federalism can operate in this way by formally memorializing
negotiated compromises that divide issues between central and subnational government. Federalism
may also alleviate the zero-sum game in a less formal way. By simply creating legally independent
political arenas, political parties will gravitate towards those arenas where they are most likely to be
successful. Multiple arenas create more chances that more parties will at least find one arena where
they can gain significant support. This obviously increases the chances that meaningful political
opposition will develop. It also reduces the need for national consensus on all issues, and,
consequently, mitigates the incentives to quash opposition. Unitary regimes do not afford this
alternative.
25. See infra Part III.C (defending this claim); Marshfield, supra note 24, at 625–28 (explaining
how this actually occurred in South Africa during the transition to democracy).
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its prospects for fostering political competition. 26 It then examines the role
that South Africa‘s federal structure has played in the various recent
successes of parties opposing the ANC. The Article concludes that South
Africa‘s federal structure is conducive to fostering political opposition and
that, notwithstanding the ANC‘s prevailing dominance, evidence suggests
that South Africa‘s federal structure is gradually fostering healthy political
competition. The Article then looks forward to South Africa‘s 2014
general elections and analyzes which opposition parties are best situated to
take advantage of South Africa‘s federal structure and challenge the ANC.
This Article has eight major parts. Part I explores the theoretical
connection between political competition and democratic stability and
proposes three reasons why democratic stability is inextricably linked to
political competition. Part II explains some of the major obstacles to
constructive political competition facing emerging democracies. Part III
develops and defends the argument that federal systems are better situated
than unitary regimes to remove impediments to political competition
facing emerging democracies. It also describes the particular kind of
federal regime that is necessary for the model to work effectively. Parts IV
through VII analyze South Africa‘s federal structure in light of the model
and determine that the South African system both satisfies necessary legal
parameters and is in fact fostering political competition. Part VIII
concludes by examining the current nature and status of the most notable
opposition parties in South Africa and explores their prospects for
challenging the ANC in the country‘s next general election in 2014.
I. POLITICAL COMPETITION AND DEMOCRATIC STABILITY
Theorists have long struggled to identify background conditions
necessary for maintaining stable democracies. 27 Studies have revealed
compelling correlations between democratic stability and certain
economic, cultural, and political conditions. 28 In this vein, there is general

26. South Africa presents an ideal test case for this thesis for several reasons. First, South Africa
underwent a dramatic transition from apartheid to democracy that culminated with the country‘s first
all-inclusive election in 1994. Second, the politics of post-apartheid South Africa have been dominated
by a single party, the ANC. Third, since the fall of apartheid, South Africa has operated under a
constitutionally protected federal structure. Fourth, notwithstanding the ANC‘s political dominance,
post-apartheid South Africa has always had several organized and active opposition parties.
27. The study that is most frequently credited with first attempting to identify correlations
between democratic stability and economic, cultural, and social background conditions is SEYMOUR
MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL B ASES OF POLITICS (1981).
28. Prominent studies include: PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 5; Carles Boix & Susan C.
Stokes, Endogenous Democratization, 55 WORLD POL. 517 (2003); Daron Acemoglu & James A.
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consensus among democratic theorists that there is a strong empirical
correlation between political competition and democratic stability. 29
Stable, long-lasting democracies almost universally correlate with
alternation in political power between at least two political parties. 30
Although this empirical correlation has strong intuitive appeal, it is
largely unhelpful on its own because it fails to provide a sound theoretical
explanation for the nexus between political competition and democracy. 31
Why does meaningful political competition tend to correlate with
democratic stability? This question is particularly important from an
institutional design perspective. If constitution-makers are to intelligently
tailor legal arrangements to the problems facing emerging democracies, it
is essential that they have a working theory regarding the nexus between

Robinson, A Theory of Political Transitions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 938 (2001); Julian Wucherpfennig &
Franziska Deutsch, Modernization and Democracy: Theories and Evidence Revisited, 2009 LIVING
REVS. DEMOCRACY, at 1 (providing comprehensive summary of state of economic development
theory).
29. Jung & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 272 (―it is doubtful that any regime could long survive as
minimally democratic without‖ genuine political opposition); Moore, supra note 10, at 83 (―[t]he key
characteristic of liberal democracy . . . is the existence of a legitimate and, to some extent, effective
opposition.‖); see also Robert A. Dahl, Preface to POLITICAL O PPOSITIONS IN WESTERN
DEMOCRACIES xi (Robert A. Dahl ed. 1966) (―the right of an organized opposition to appeal for votes
against the government in elections . . .‖ is one of the ―great milestones in the development of
democratic institutions.‖); Stephanie Lawson, Conceptual Issues in the Comparative Study of Regime
Change and Democratization, 25 COMP. POL. 183, 192–93 (1993) (―[P]olitical opposition is the sine
qua non of contemporary democracy in mass polities and . . . its institutionalization in some form or
another is required before a regime can be called ‗democratic‘ with any real meaning.‖).
30. See PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 5, 23–30, 51–55 (providing summary of all regime years
in all countries between 1950 and 1990 and conducting statistical analysis of relationship between
―stability and change of political leadership‖); see also LIJPHART, G OVERNMENT FORMS AND
PERFORMANCE, supra note 8, at 76 (cataloguing alternations in political power within thirty-six
democracies between 1945–1996). This empirical correlation led Samuel P. Huntington to articulate
his now famous ―two-turnover‖ test for democratic consolidation. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at
266–69. Huntington determined the surest test for democratic consolidation was whether ―the party or
group that takes power in the initial election at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and
turns over power to those election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over
power to the winners of a later election.‖ Id. at 266–67. This is a demanding test, however, and many,
including Huntington, recognize that it is probably under-inclusive of consolidated democracies. Id. at
267 (noting that the U.S. did not pass two-turnover test until 1840); see also Omar G. Encarnación,
Beyond Transitions: The Politics of Democratic Consolidation, 32 COMP. POL. 479, 486–87 (2000)
(discussing problems with the two-turnover test).
31. Truisms regarding the relationship between political competition and democracy are
plentiful. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968) (―Competition in ideas and
governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process . . . .‖). Informed theories regarding the
precise connection between democracy and competition are more difficult to find. See Peter H.
Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1365 (1987) (noting that Supreme Court precedent dealing with party
competition ―beg[s] questions that lie at the heart of political competition in a democracy‖).
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political competition and democratic stability; particularly any causal
relationship that may exist between the two. 32
This section argues that there are at least three reasons that political
competition may be linked with democratic stability: (1) political
competition is indicative of the fact that social conflicts have been brought
within democratic processes; (2) political competition creates incentives
for leaders to govern well; and (3) political competition can reduce agency
costs associated with representative government. 33
A. Political Competition as Indicative of Democratic Consolidation
Benjamin Franklin could have added social disagreement to his famous
list of life‘s certainties.34 Western political theory is based on the
assumption that a sovereign authority is necessary to mediate inevitable
social conflict and disagreement. 35 Liberal democracy is part of this
tradition. 36 Although it vests ultimate sovereignty in the people, it
recognizes that people will inevitably disagree and that there must be a fair
means of resolving these disagreements. 37 Democratic processes are

32. There is a healthy body of literature struggling with a definition of political competition in
democracies. See Charles Simpkins, Stability and Competitiveness in the Political Configurations of
Semi-Developed Countries, in THE AWKWARD EMBRACE, supra note 5, 47, 49–51 (discussing
literature). This Article adopts the standard description offered by Giovanni Santori, which holds that
political competition exist if the political system contains more than one contestant and ―circumstances
must be imaginable in which challenger parties can defeat the predominant party.‖ Id. at 49 (citing
GIOVANNI SANTORI, PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS (1976)); see supra
notes 34–49 and accompanying text (discussing how this definition is intrinsic to democratic
assumptions).
33. The first reason is descriptive. It attempts to explain why an observable correlation between
democratic stability and political competition occurs. It does not, however, offer a theory of causation
regarding the relationship between political competition and democratic stability; political competition
is symptomatic of democratic stability and is not necessarily the cause of stability. The remaining two
reasons, however, do offer causal theories. They suggest ways that political competition can contribute
to democratic stability.
34. See Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Jean Baptiste Le Roy (Nov. 13, 1789), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, 1789–1790 69 (Albert H. Smyth ed., 1907) (―[I]n this world
nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.‖).
35. Hobbes presents perhaps the most well-known example of this theme within western political
theory. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: WITH SELECTED VARIANTS FROM THE LATIN EDITION OF
1668 ch. XXIX (Edwin Curley ed., 1994) (discussing the need for sovereign to cure ills of state of
nature); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999
SUP. CT. REV. 337, 339 (discussing Hobbes‘s contribution).
36. John Locke‘s theory of democracy is illustrative. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT 42–56 (C.B. Mcpherson ed., 1980).
37. See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 36, at 48 (―And this puts men out of a state of nature into that of
a common-wealth, by -setting up a judge on earth, with authority to determine all controversies, and
redress the injuries that may happen to any member of the of the common-wealth; which judge is the
legislative, or magistrates appointed by it. And where-ever there are any number of men, however
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considered fair because they respect individual preferences and retain a
commitment to the people as the ultimate authority rather than the
people‘s leaders.38
Thus, if we assume that social disagreement is inevitable, the stability
and longevity of a democratic regime ultimately depends not on conditions
such as social homogeneity or tranquility, but on whether all the necessary
power groups within a society have endorsed democratic processes as the
only legitimate means of resolving political conflicts. 39 For democracy to
be consolidated, groups and individual citizens must respect democratic
outputs even if those outputs conflict with their own preferences or
interests.40
It is notoriously difficult to determine whether a society has achieved
democratic consolidation. 41 However, an absence of political competition
within democratic processes is highly indicative of non-consolidation. 42
Samuel P. Huntington has noted: ―In any society, the sustained failure of
the major opposition political party to win office necessarily raises
questions concerning the degree of competition permitted by the
system.‖43 Implicit in Huntington‘s hypothesis is the assumption that
associated, that have not such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in the state of nature.‖);
PRZEWORSKI, supra note 9, at 95 (―Conflicts of values and of interests are inherent in all societies. . . .
Democracy is only a system for processing conflicts without killing one another; it is a system in
which there are differences, conflicts, winners and losers.‖).
38. See John Ferejohn, Must Preferences be Respected in a Democracy?, in THE IDEA OF
DEMOCRACY 231 (David Copp et al. eds., 1993) (discussing democracy‘s role in respecting
preferences).
39. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at 266–69. Obviously, homogeneity and other social
conditions make this level of agreement more or less probable and more or less easier to obtain. See
Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 Am. J. Int‘l L. 489,
526 (2001) (noting possible role of homogeneity in democratic stability but noting that democracy
does not require a common demos).
40. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at 266–69; see also JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND
DISAGREEMENT 147–63 (1999) (explaining how democratic processes respect all citizens‘ preferences
even though the minority is ultimately subject to will of the majority).
41. See supra note 30 (discussing Huntington‘s two-turnover test for consolidation and critiques
of this test); PRZEWORSKI, supra note 5, at 13–36 (discussing problems with determining consolidation
and expounding a four-part test); see generally THE DEMOCRACY SOURCEBOOK 1–55 (Robert A. Dahl
et al. eds., 2003) (providing a helpful sampling of excerpts from various democratic theorists debating
competing conceptions of democracy and democratic consolidation).
42. See PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 5, at 23–28 (crafting an ―alternation rule‖ in order to
ensure that non-democratic societies are not misclassified).
43. HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at 8. Huntington‘s test assumes that within a free society,
politics will always be characterized by some degree of political competition. Thus, if there is no
observable political competition as evidenced by electoral victories, the system must have erected
restrains to political competition. Id. Huntington‘s definition must be moderated by the realization that
different political systems reflect political competition in different ways. See Jung & Shapiro, supra
note 9, at 274. First-past-the-post electoral systems, for example, usually result in two-party systems
and highly visible alternation in political power. Id. Multi-party systems usually result in coalition
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democracy involves the resolution of conflict between competing groups.
If there is a systematic absence of any meaningful political opposition, this
is most likely because the system is curbing opposition, not because the
society is void of any political disagreement. Another alternative that
Huntington overlooks is that political opposition exists, but it refuses to
recognize democratic processes as legitimate. 44 In either case, there is a
lack of consolidation because major social conflicts have not been brought
within democratic processes. 45
Disagreement in emerging democracies is all the more certain.
Societies that transition from authoritarianism to democracy inevitably
consist of many individuals, groups, and institutions with conflicting
loyalties. 46 These societies are inevitably fractured and characterized by
various political, cultural, and social cleavages. The challenge for
emerging democracies is how to institutionalize these conflicts. 47 That is,
emerging democracies must convince all major social groups to endorse
democratic procedures and institutions as the proper means of resolving
conflict. Until they do so, they remain a threat to the democratic order
itself.48
The corollary of this is that a lack of political opposition within
democratic processes indicates a lack of consolidation. 49 Political
competition is inextricably linked with political stability because it reflects
the fact that all major groups have endorsed democratic processes as
legitimate.
B. Political Competition and the Public Good
Political competition is also linked to democratic stability for a more
practical reason: it provides an incentive for leaders to govern well. 50

governments where alternation is less visible. Id.; see also LIJPHART, GOVERNMENT FORMS AND
PERFORMANCE, supra note 8, at 10–47 (discussing how these kinds of electoral systems manifest
political competition in various countries).
44. See Jung & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 272.
45. Id.
46. See GIUSEPPE DI PALMA, TO CRAFT DEMOCRACIES: AN ESSAY ON DEMOCRATIC
TRANSITIONS 55 (1990).
47. DI PALMA, supra note 46, at 55.
48. PRZEWORSKI, supra note 9, at 19; DI PALMA, supra note 46, at 55; Jung & Shapiro, supra
note 9, at 272.
49. Dahl, supra note 29, at xvi (―[O]ne is inclined to regard the existence of an opposition party
as very nearly the most distinctive characteristic of democracy itself; and we take the absence of an
opposition party as evidence, if not always conclusive proof, for the absence of democracy.‖).
50. See Jung & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 272–73 (alluding to the idea that competition may
create incentives for refined government outputs); Habib & Taylor, supra note 2, at 261–62
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Meaningful political competition creates the realistic possibility that
current leadership will be replaced if it does not perform. 51 An organized
political opposition presents the public with alternative government
policies, which can incite public debate and criticism regarding the
incumbent‘s ineffective practices and policies. This creates an incentive
for the majority party to deliberate, prospectively, regarding the best
course of action, which, in turn, creates incentives to avoid making rash
decisions. All of these dynamics can work together to prevent government
from adopting minimally vetted policies. 52
The existence of an organized political opposition creates a market for
public policy. It puts pressure on the ruling party to critically evaluate its
own policies and ensure that it governs prudently and well. In this way,
political competition can raise the substantive quality of government
outputs, which, in turn, promotes democratic stability by ensuring that the
people are satisfied with their government‘s performance. 53 This is a
causal theory. Political competition contributes to democratic stability by
refining government outputs and therefore reinforcing the legitimacy of
democratic processes.
C. Political Competition and Agency Costs
Political competition is further linked to democratic stability because it
reduces agency costs inherent in representative government. A major
problem facing any representative democracy is the incongruence of
interests between the people and their representatives. 54 Democracy
presumes that elected representatives will be accountable to the people.
Elected representatives are, however, human. They have their own

(discussing the purification value of political competition in South Africa as a means of dealing with
economic crisis).
51. See Frederick M. Barnard, Between Opposition and Political Opposition: The Search for
Competitive Politics in Czechoslovakia, 5 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 533 (1972) (discussing genuine political
competition as a means of reforming communist Czechoslovakia from within).
52. See Jung & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 272–73; see also Hermann Giliomee et al., Dominant
Party Rule, Opposition Parties and Minorities in South Africa, in OPPOSITION AND DEMOCRACY IN
SOUTH AFRICA 161 (R. Southall ed., 2001) (discussing how political opposition in South Africa could
perform these functions).
53. See generally Christian List & Robert E. Goodin, Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the
Condorcet Jury Theorem, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 277 (2001) (discussing how multiple sources of input,
especially competing sources, in the democratic process can refine democratic outputs); Jeremy
Waldron, The Wisdom of the Multitudes: Some Reflections on Book 3, Chapter 11 of Aristotle’s
Politics, 23 POL. THEORY 563 (1995) (same).
54. See David B. Spence, Administrative Law and Agency Policy-Making: Rethinking the
Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 407, 440 (1997) (discussing incongruence of
interests in representative government).
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independent interests that may diverge from those of their constituents,
and, more problematically, representatives are not always able or willing
to advocate for all of their constituents‘ preferences. 55
Competitive elections provide one means of holding representatives
accountable.56 Challengers have strong incentives to expose political
corruption and emphasize an incumbent‘s broken promises. 57 These
incentives create, in turn, counter-incentives for incumbents to govern
honestly and follow through on promises so that they will not be
vulnerable to defeat come election time. Competitive elections, therefore,
can reduce agency costs and thereby promote democratic legitimacy.
However, elections occur relatively infrequently and allow candidates
to group popular actions with unpopular actions and thereby avoid, to a
degree, strict political accountability. 58 One way to recover these residual
agency costs is to ensure that representatives are required to interact with
counter-representatives. 59 Political competition between representatives
can also play a key role in reducing agency costs. Opposition
representatives have real continuing incentives to ―ask[] awkward
questions, shin[e] light in dark places, and expos[e] abuses of power.‖60
This forces officials to give reasons for and justify their policies, which
further reduces their ability to pursue their own interests at the people‘s
expense. 61 Political competition between representatives can help to ensure
that ruling elites are kept in check, that they follow through on promises

55. See generally ANNE PHILLIPS, ENGENDERING DEMOCRACY (1991) (discussing the agency
costs associated with representative democracy); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding
Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 245–
47 (1986) (outlining agency costs associated with representative government).
56. See generally Bernard Manin, et al., Elections and Representation, in DEMOCRACY,
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 29 (Przeworski et al. eds., 1999) (outlining the basic logic
underlying electoral systems as a basis of accountability); Brandice Canes-Wrone et al., Out of Step,
Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members’ Voting, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 127
(2002) (concluding that elections are effective means of holding representatives accountable); Jose
Antonia Cheibub & Adam Przeworski, Democracy, Elections, and Accountability for Economic
Outcomes, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 222 (Przeworski et al. eds.,
1999) (discussing elections as means of holding leaders responsible for economic outcomes).
57. See Jung & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 272–73.
58. John Ferejohn, Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political Accountability, in
DEMOCRACY, supra note 55, 132 [hereinafter Ferejohn, Accountability] (discussing other reasons why
elections are not a complete solution to problem of accountability); see John Dunn, Situating
Democratic Political Accountability, in DEMOCRACY, supra note 55, at 329 (discussing problems
associated with relying exclusively on elections as means of holding representatives accountable);
Ferejohn, supra note 14 (discussing the problem of agency costs in-between election cycles).
59. See Ferejohn, Accountability, supra note 58, at 132 (discussing this alternative).
60. See Jung & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 272.
61. Id. at 272–73.
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made to the public, and that they are attentive to their constituents‘
demands and preferences. 62
In these ways, political competition minimizes disconnects between the
people and their government, which reduces the likelihood that the people
will become dissatisfied with democratic processes, thus promoting
political stability. 63 The absence of vibrant political competition represents
a vulnerability to democracy because elected representatives have few
incentives to pursue the people‘s interests and preferences over their own
interests.64
II. THE DIFFICULTY OF FOSTERING POLITICAL COMPETITION IN
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES
Notwithstanding the tight nexus between political competition and
democratic stability, emerging democracies face unique circumstances that
make meaningful political competition difficult. This section focuses on
two particularly challenging problems faced by emerging democracies. 65
The remainder of this Article explores how federalism can help facilitate
political competition in emerging democracies by overcoming these two
problems.
A. Political Opposition and the Exigencies of Political Transition
Societies that transition from authoritarianism to democracy face many
challenges. One of those challenges is to prove to the people and
competing elites that democracy is a more effective form of government

62. Id.
63. See generally LIPSET, supra note 27, at 64 (discussing citizen and elites‘ perception of
effective government as a key variable in democratic stability).
64. These benefits of political competition are not democratic luxuries. The absence of political
competition generally corresponds with political pathologies such as bad government outputs,
increased dissatisfaction with democratic processes, and government corruption. For a general
discussion of the pathologies associated with an absence of political competition, see Lawrence
Schlemmer, Deformations of Political Culture by One-Party Dominance, in CHALLENGES TO
DEMOCRACY BY O NE-PARTY D OMINANCE: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 117 (Andrea E. Ostheimer
ed., 2006).
65. For a helpful summary of the research regarding the unique problems facing emerging
democracies, see Michael Bratton, Deciphering Africa’s Divergent Transitions, 112 POL. SCI. Q. 67,
77–80 (1997) (discussing specific problems facing development of opposition and democratic
consolidation more generally in emerging democracies). Democratic consolidation in emerging
democracies is incredibly complicated. Id. The purpose here is not to provide a complete theory of the
problems facing emerging democracies. Rather, the focus is on those recognized problems that
federalism is uniquely suited to addressing.
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than authoritarianism. 66 This is particularly true regarding economic
development.67 Emerging democracies must demonstrate that they can
promote economic growth and deliver necessary government services. 68
However, this sort of government efficiency and production requires
cooperation and consensus between powerful elites.69 Emerging
democracies can scarcely afford to be locked in political stalemates and
power struggles.70 They typically have a small window of opportunity to
demonstrate that democracy, rather than authoritarianism, is the preferred
form of government. 71 Thus, the stability of new democratic regimes
―depends, first, on the ability of the principal political elites—party
leaders, military leaders, and business leaders—to work together to deal
with the problems confronting their society.‖ 72 These pressures create
incentives for the dominant party to quash opposition groups that fail to
―get on board.‖
Another familiar challenge for emerging democracies is the problem of
―loyal opposition.‖73 By definition, emerging democracies are
transitioning to democracy from some form of authoritarianism. 74 This
means that portions of the society inevitably supported the prior, nondemocratic regime. 75 This dynamic can blur the all-important line between
opposition to democratic processes and opposition to the policies and
66. See LIPSET, supra note 27, at 61–72 (discussing connection between government‘s actual
performance and democratic stability); Larry Diamond et al., Democracy in Developing Countries:
Facilitating and Obstructing Factors, in FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES 229, 231 (Raymond D. Gastil ed., 1988) (discussing relationship between effectiveness and
legitimacy). The precise relationship between government effectiveness and stability is not
uncontested. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at 258. However, the basic logic that effectiveness
undermines legitimacy and contributes to instability remains sound. Id.
67. Lipset famously posited this correlation. Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of
Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959); see
also LIPSET, supra note 27, at 27–58.
68. HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at 258.
69. Id.; see Juan Linz & Alfred Stepon, Political Crafting of Democratic Consolidation or
Destruction: European and South American Comparisons, in DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS:
STOPPING THE PENDULUM 41, 58–59 (Robert A. Pastor ed., 1989) (discussing the difficult economic
conditions facing Colombia and Venezuela and how coordination between elites sustained democratic
stability in the 1960s).
70. HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at 257–59.
71. Id. at 256–57 (discussing phenomenon of ―authoritarian nostalgia‖ that often follows
ineffective democratic regimes).
72. Id. at 259; see also Habib & Taylor, supra note 2, at 262 (discussing how economic
effectiveness is fast becoming a primary concern for South Africa‘s democratic consolidation).
73. See supra note 10.
74. See supra note 6 (discussing definitions of ―authoritarianism,‖ ―democracy,‖ and ―emerging
democracies‖).
75. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at 266–70.
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actions of the first-elected government.76 Consequently, opposition in
emerging democracies can be a precarious endeavor for political leaders. 77
First-elected governments often succumb to the temptation to decry all
opposition as anti-democratic and pro-authoritarianism. 78 These political
circumstances make it difficult for political opposition to be taken
seriously on the merits and easy for the first-elected government to obtain
popular support for formal restraints on political opposition.
However, as discussed above, political competition plays a key role in
democratic stability because it puts government policies to the test and
fosters constructive deliberation rather than rash, knee-jerk reactions. 79
Emerging democracies desperately need constructive political deliberation
so that they can bring dangerous social conflicts within democratic
processes and secure substantively desirable government outputs. 80 The
legitimacy of the new democratic order depends, to some extent, on both
of these things.
Emerging democracies therefore face polarizing forces. On the one
hand, they have a genuine need for consensus, compromise, and unity in
order to meet basic social needs and move their societies away from alltoo-immediate authoritarian pasts. On the other hand, the pathologies
associated with a lack of political competition may undermine the very
purpose for which consensus is necessary. 81 Thus, there is a need for
institutional arrangements that address these exigencies and provide ways
for these societies to foster constructive political opposition that does not
fatally undermine government efficacy and legitimacy.

76. See Michael Bratton & Nicolas Van de Walle, Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political
Transitions in Africa, 46 WORLD POL. 453 (1994) (discussing how antecedent political culture
dramatically affects success and potency of successive democratic elections).
77. Zimbabwe provides a horrifying example of this phenomenon. See Christine Sylvester,
Whither Opposition in Zimbabwe?, 33 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 403, 407–10 (1995) (discussing overt
oppression of political opposition and dangers of engaging in political competition within Zimbabwe).
78. Id. at 403–04; see also Moore, supra note 10, at 83–87 (discussing this phenomenon in
context of former Soviet states).
79. See supra Part I.B–C.
80. Id.; see also Habib & Taylor, supra note 2, at 261–64 (discussing the need for these
processes in post-apartheid South Africa); Giliomee, et al., supra note 52, at 161 (same); cf. Southall,
supra note 2, at 65–66 (suggesting mitigating factors that may reduce urgency of need for political
competition in post-apartheid South Africa).
81. See N. Ganesan, Appraising Democratic Developments in Postauthoritarian States: Thailand
and Indonesia, 28 ASIAN AFF.3, 14 (2001) (discussing tension between economic development and
political competition in Indonesia and Thailand). See generally Andrew C. Gould, Conflicting
Imperatives and Concept Formation, 61 REV. POL. 439, 448–49 (1999) (discussing conflict between
consensus and competitive mobilization as deep problem in theory of state-society relations);
Schlemmer, supra note 64, at 118–20 (discussing pathologies associated with an absence of political
competition).
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B. The Problem of Political Track Records and Voter Behavior in
Emerging Democracies
If one looks at a sampling of emerging democracies, a troubling trend
is visible: voters frequently reelect bad leadership. 82 This trend has been
attributed to two challenges facing voters in emerging democracies.
First, emerging democracies do not have a pool of democratically
proven leaders or policies from which to draw. 83 Established democracies
typically have an entire guild of political professionals who have been
trained to exercise political power within the confines of constitutional
constraints and for the public good.84 Established democracies also tend to
have at least some collective experience with a variety of different
substantive policies.85 This diversity of candidates and experiences
provides voters with multiple points of comparison that they can use to
legitimately distinguish between candidates and policies within a
democratic system. 86 In emerging democracies, on the other hand, political
candidates will typically have no government experience or will have
experience operating only within the preexisting authoritarian system. 87
Voters and leaders also have no experience with democratically generated
substantive policies. This means that the first-elected leaders will set the
bar for the society‘s democratic expectations, and, consequently, voters
will have no basis by which to judge the performance of their first-elected
leadership. 88 A real impediment to democratic competition in emerging

82. Zimbabwe again provides another example, especially during the period while formal legal
restraints on opposition and overt strong-arm tactics by President Mugabe were relatively
underdeveloped. See Sylvester, supra note 77, at 407–10; see also GILIOMEE & SIMKINS, supra note 5,
at 59–69 (discussing this phenomenon in other countries).
83. See Bratton & Van de Walle, supra note 76, at 453 (discussing how antecedent political
culture dramatically affects success and potency of successive democratic elections); Myerson, supra
note 12, at 4.
84. The degree to which leaders live up to these expectations is somewhat irrelevant. The point is
that the political culture operates on the basis of these ideals. Voters, leaders, and political parties build
their platforms and form their choices based on reputation and promises that use the language of
constitutional constraint and the public good.
85. This refers to various different economic or social ideologies that are nevertheless compatible
with democratic process. One can easily think of competing economic ideologies within the U.S. as
helpful examples.
86. This is not to suggest an idealized view of politics in established democracies. The point is
one of comparison. Within established democracies, comparisons are made based on policy platforms
that are framed in terms of a theory of public good and a theory of constitutional fidelity. Voters
discriminate on the basis of these arguments. Within emerging democracies, these arguments are
usually impossible because of the lack of democratic leaders and because of the voter‘s inability to
properly respond to democratic political arguments.
87. Myerson, supra note 12, at 4.
88. See John D. Holm et al., The Development of Civil Society in a Democratic State: The
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democracies is that voters have no point of reference to use in
distinguishing between competing candidates and those candidates‘
respective substantive policy platforms. 89
Second, because emerging democracies do not have a pool of proven
leaders or tested substantive policies, voters have no reason to expect that
opposition leaders will behave any differently than incumbents, or that
opposition policies will be any more effective. 90 Even if the first-elected
leadership performs poorly, voters have no credible reason to believe that
opposition leaders or policies will perform any better. If we accept that
there are inherent costs associated with replacing incumbent leaders 91—
such as popular loyalty to the first-elected leader because of that leader‘s
role in overthrowing the authoritarian regime—voters are unlikely to
replace incumbent leaders with unproven challengers. 92
These dynamics can prevent emerging democracies from developing
vibrant political competition.93 They essentially eradicate any competitive
market for the people‘s vote because the people have no reason to believe
that replacing the incumbent with an opposition leader will result in
meaningful political change. Thus, as one theorist has noted, ―the central
problem for a new democracy may be to create good democratic
reputations where they have not previously existed.‖94 Once a society
begins to produce a pool of democratically proven leaders and policies,
voters have better reason to believe that one leader or policy will be better
than another. This fosters a competitive market for votes, which sets the
stage for meaningful political competition and all of its attendant virtues.

Botswana Model, 39 AFR. STUD. REV.43 (1996) (discussing how underdeveloped civil society affects
citizens ability to form political expectations after democratization); see also Bratton & Van de Walle,
supra note 76, at 453 (discussing how antecedent political regimes impede development of necessary
democratic skills).
89. See PIPPA NORRIS, DEMOCRATIC PHOENIX: REINVENTING POLITICAL ACTIVISM 35–82
(2002) (conducting an empirical analysis of voter behavior in dominant-party states); Robert Mattes,
Voter Behaviour and Party Dominance in South Africa: Another View, in CHALLENGES, supra note 64,
at 105.
90. See Sylvester, supra note 77, at 407–10 (discussing this defect in terms of a ―weak civil
society‖ in Zimbabwe). See generally Jean-François Bayart, Civil Society in Africa, in POLITICAL
DOMINATION IN AFRICA: REFLECTIONS ON THE LIMITS OF POWER 109, 112 (Patrick Chabal ed., 1986)
(discussing general problems with under-developed democratic civil societies that result in one-party
dominance).
91. See Myerson, supra note 12, at 4–6.
92. Id. at 4–5.
93. See Julias E. Nyang‘oro, Reform Politics and the Democratization Process in Africa, 37 AFR.
STUD. REV. 133 (1994) (discussing information defects in civil society in emerging democracies);
Peter M. Lewis, Political Transition and the Dilemma of Civil Society in Africa, 46 J. INT‘L AFF. 31,
50–54 (1992) (same).
94. Myerson, supra note 12, at 4.
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As discussed below, federalism is uniquely suited to proliferating political
track records and creating incentives for good governance.
III. A THEORY OF POLITICAL COMPETITION WITHIN FEDERAL SYSTEMS
Notwithstanding the real problems facing emerging democracies, there
has been almost no theoretical research exploring institutional design and
incentives for constructive political competition. 95 Some theorists have
considered the ways in which different electoral systems can affect
political competition.96 Douglas Rae, for example, has concluded that firstpast-the-post electoral systems are likely to produce two-party societies,
which, in turn, can facilitate strong political opposition in established
democracies.97 There has also been some discussion regarding the
implications for political competition of consociational electoral systems. 98
With the exception of Roger B. Myerson‘s model regarding political
corruption discussed below, there has been essentially no theoretical
discussion of the ways that federal arrangements may facilitate or impede
political competition. This section fills that gap in the literature.
A. Myerson’s Theory of Character-Based Track Records in Federal
Regimes
Myerson crafted a formal game theory model that was addressed to the
specific problem of political corruption. Myerson‘s formal proof
demonstrated that federal regimes can promote honest government better
than unitary regimes because they allow opposition politicians to develop
independent track records for honesty. 99 Myerson‘s model is very narrow
in scope—his express assumptions limit the model‘s applicability solely to

95. Robert Dahl‘s 1966 work remains the seminal authority on political competition and
democracy. Dahl, supra note 29. Dahl made various conceptual recommendations regarding
institutional design and political competition. Id. at 351–52. Yet, with the exception of his suggestions
regarding electoral systems, these suggestions have not been revisited or empirically tested.
96. See, e.g., Joel D. Barkan et al., Space Matters: Designing Better Electoral Systems for
Emerging Democracies, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 926 (2006).
97. DOUGLAS W. RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS (1967); see Jung
& Shapiro, supra note 9, at 274 (discussing Rae in the context of emerging democracies).
98. See Jung & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 273 (concluding that consociational systems work
against political competition). Consociationalism is often associated with Arend Lijphart‘s articulation
of a non-territorial based system of decentralized power. See Arend Lijphart, Consociational
Democracy, 21 WORLD POL. 213, 222 (1969); see also ELAZAR, supra note 21, at 18–26 (discussing
consociationalism).
99. Myerson, supra note 12, at 4–5.
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the issue of corruption in unitary regimes. 100 However, as discussed more
fully below, his basic logic can be extrapolated to provide a more general
theory of political competition in federal regimes if certain key parameters
are observed. This Article first summarizes Myerson‘s model and
assumptions and then argues for a different set of parameters that allow for
an expanded model of political competition in federal regimes.
1. Myerson’s Basic Logic
Myerson‘s model addresses the ―chances of success for a new
democracy‖ where the first set of democratically elected leaders have no
democratic credentials.101 Myerson presents the problem in terms of a
game theory equilibrium where voters rationally assume that the first
elected leaders will behave as previous leaders did under the nondemocratic regime. 102 That is, political leaders will use power and
resources to benefit elites rather than the voting public. 103 In a unitary
state, voters may also rationally assume that other challengers would
behave the same way because they do not have a proven reputation under
the new democratic regime. 104 Thus, when rational voters consider
transition costs associated with replacing a corrupt national incumbent,
they have no incentive to replace him and no reason to oppose his
suppression of political opposition. This results in the first-elected leader
being repeatedly re-elected, but without any incentive for serving the
public.105
Myerson concludes that federalism can help to alleviate this problem.
Federalism can promote political competition by providing opposition
politicians with opportunities to develop democratic reputations and,
consequently, enhance the credibility of their opposition platforms. 106
Once opposition leaders have developed credible subnational track
records, voters are more willing to pay the transition costs associated with
removing an incumbent leader because the challenger‘s track record gives
voters confidence that his commitment to honesty is credible. 107 This
credible threat to corrupt national politicians gives those politicians a

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Myerson, supra note 12, at 4, 19.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 13–14.
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reciprocal incentive to reform and govern honestly thus fostering
constructive political competition in the regime as a whole. 108
2. Myerson’s Parameters and Assumptions
Myerson makes various assumptions regarding voter behavior, political
leadership, and the structure of the federal system. Regarding voters, he
assumes that they always prefer responsible over corrupt government, but
they ―perceive some costs or risks of changing the leaders . . . .‖109 Thus, if
voters suspect that a future leader ―would govern corruptly, then voters
would rationally re-elect corrupt leaders . . . .‖110 Myerson also assumes
that voters ―have no disagreements regarding public policy decisions‖ that
would cause them to rationally vote for corrupt leaders. 111 Implicit in
Myerson‘s theory is the further assumption that voters find politicians‘
bald promises incredible, but find past performance to be a good indicator
of future performance.
Thus, in Myerson‘s model, voters decide whom to vote for based
entirely on the candidate‘s proven reputation and transition costs of
installing a new leader. Myerson‘s theory is therefore less likely to apply
in a system where people vote primarily based on group identities or
solidarities. The model also does not address the reality of conflicting and
cross-cutting voter preferences. Myerson assumes that voters will choose
honest leaders over corrupt leaders regardless of the leader‘s stance on any
other policy. 112 This assumption is important when attempting to
extrapolate Myerson‘s logic beyond its application to government
corruption.
Regarding political leadership, Myerson assumes that political leaders
tend to govern corruptly unless they have an incentive to govern
responsibly. 113 He also assumes that, within a federal system, leaders
always prefer national over subnational office. 114 When these assumptions
are combined with Myerson‘s assumptions about voters, subnational

108. Id. at 19–20.
109. Id. at 6.
110. Id.
111. Myerson, supra note 12, at 6.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 6–7 (―[P]olitical leaders would generally prefer to govern corruptly.‖). He accounts for
the fact that some leaders may be ―intrinsically virtuous.‖ Id. at 8–9. However, he assumes that the
probability of any challenger being intrinsically virtuous is too small for voters to risk the costs of
installing a new leader on the hope that the new leader would be intrinsically virtuous. Id. at 9–10.
Thus, the possibility of a virtuous leader has no real affect on his model.
114. Id. at 12.
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leaders are incentivized to govern responsibly because a positive track
record could help them ascend to national office.115 Responsible
governance at the subnational level provides a reciprocal incentive for
national leaders to govern responsibly so as to avoid being replaced by
subnational leaders.116
Myerson‘s assumptions regarding the nature of the federal system are
most important for present purposes. He assumes that both national and
subnational leaders are elected for a fixed term and must run for ―reelection again in each period until rejected by the voters.‖117 National and
subnational leaders are assumed to be elected separately.118 Myerson
further assumes that subnational leaders ―exercise independent political
powers which can be used to demonstrate their qualifications for national
leadership.‖119
With these assumptions in place, Myerson‘s logic is clear. Voters
prefer honest leaders over corrupt leaders. Voters tend to disbelieve
politicians‘ promises and use past performance to predict future behavior.
Thus, because of replacement costs, voters will not remove a corrupt
incumbent leader unless the challenger has a history of honest governance.
Independent subnational governance provides aspiring national leaders
with an opportunity to develop track records of honesty that correlate to
qualities necessary for national leadership. This correlation allows
subnational leaders to translate their subnational reputation into a credible
opposition platform at the national level, which, in turn, results in the
national leadership either reforming itself or being replaced.
B. Toward a Broader Theory of Political Competition in Federal Regimes
Political track records can be divided into at least two different types:
(1) character-based track records, and (2) policy-based track records. As
used here, a character-based track record refers to a general reputation for
honest rather than corrupt governance. Policy-based track records refer to
a party‘s reputation for enacting prudent (and presumably popular)
substantive policies as well as administrative policies that affect the
efficient delivery of government services. Policy-based track records also

115. Id. at 19–20.
116. Id.
117. Myerson, supra note 12, at 7.
118. Id. at 21.
119. Id. Myerson describes this assumption as the ―key‖ to the model. Id. at 5 (―The key is that
provincial leaders exercise real governmental power, and their hopes of rising to national leadership
can increase their incentive to use this power responsibly.‖).
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include a party‘s qualifications for and proven competence in policymaking and administrative responsibilities. Myerson applies his theory
only to character-based track records.120 This section argues that
Myerson‘s basic logic can be applied to policy-based track records if we
account for three new variables: (1) institutional independence; (2) voter
priorities; and (3) qualitatively comparable responsibilities.
1. Institutional Independence
When examined closely, Myerson‘s model depends on the degree of
institutional separation between national and subnational government. 121
Without sufficient independence, it becomes difficult for subnational
leaders to develop marketable reputations. If subnational leaders do not
have some degree of visible independence from the center, they will not be
able to take credit for good subnational governance because national
leadership will be able to make an equal claim to their good performance.
Additionally, as subnational leaders develop good reputations, national
leaders will have incentives to exercise control over them so as to limit
political competition and take credit for their performances. 122
Because Myerson‘s model is concerned only with character-based track
records, these issues are resolved by his stated assumption that subnational
leaders are separately elected by voters rather than appointed by national
leadership. 123 Separate elections provide the minimum amount of
independence necessary for subnational leaders to develop independent
character-based track records. All government officials within a federal
democracy presumably have the volitional capacity and a legal obligation
to reject bribes. If subnational leaders are appointed by the center, national
leadership can put pressure on subnational leaders to act corruptly.124 Even
if appointed subnational leaders act honestly, national leadership could
take some credit for this because it made the appointment. 125 If subnational
leaders are separately elected, however, they have no reason to fear
removal by national leadership and they can take sole credit for their
honesty. Thus, even if subnational leaders have little or no policy
independence from the center, they may still be able to build a marketable

120. Id. at 6. Although he does not define corruption, he expressly excludes policy-based voter
preferences and eliminates the significance of intrinsically virtuous leaders from his model. Id.
121. Id. at 20.
122. Id. at 21.
123. Myerson, supra note 12, at 21.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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reputation by simply being honest—as long as they are separately
elected.126 Myerson‘s model turns on this assumption.
If Myerson‘s model is to be applied to positive track records on issues
other than corruption, subnational leaders must have a degree of
independence from the center regarding those issues. If the rules of a
federal regime are such that the center has the power to effectively
preempt or control subnational policy, Myerson‘s track-record model will
not work because as soon as subnational leaders begin to develop positive
policy reputations, national leadership will preempt or undermine those
policies.127 To extrapolate Myerson‘s theory, therefore, we must assume
that the federal regime provides some formal policy independence for
subnational leaders, as well as mechanisms for subnational leaders to
enforce their independence.
2. Voter Priorities
Institutional independence must also overlap with voter priorities.
Myerson assumes that voters have only one priority: replacing corrupt
leaders with leaders that have a reputation for honesty. 128 This assumption
drives his logic. Subnational leaders become a credible threat to national
leaders only if voters intend to promote honest subnational leaders to
national office, which, under Myerson‘s assumptions, they will always do.
If we extrapolate Myerson‘s model to apply to multiple issues, it will work
only if we assume that voters are willing to replace any national leader that
does not deliver on analogous issues or competencies. This may be a
dubious assumption when multiple issues are involved because those
issues can cut in different directions and voters are likely to prioritize
issues in a variety of ways.
Thus, in broadening Myerson‘s model to apply to policy-based track
records, we must be aware of the fact that different track records represent
different amounts of political capital depending on voter priorities.
Furthermore, the rules of a federal regime determine what kinds of
independent track records a subnational leader can develop. Many federal
regimes entrust subnational leaders with independent authority for a

126. Id.
127. As a practical matter, national leadership could simply preempt subnational substantive
policies that deviate from policies set at the center before they could be implemented.
128. Id. at 6.
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variety of administrative and policy-making responsibilities.129 If
performance in these areas is important to voters, and the rules of the
federal system protect subnational leaders‘ independence in these areas,
subnational leaders may be able to develop policy-based track records that
they can use to challenge national leadership.
In sum, the effectiveness of Myerson‘s model as applied to policybased track records depends on a degree of overlap between subnational
independence (as secured by the specific regime‘s rules) and voter
priorities. 130 The model can be extended to other kinds of track-records if
the federal regime protects subnational leaders‘ independence in areas that
are important to national voters (or at least analogous to issues that are
important to national voters).
3. Qualitatively Comparable Responsibilities
Implicit in Myerson‘s model is the idea that subnational governance is
sufficiently analogous to national governance such that if subnational
leaders are qualified for their positions, they will also be qualified for
national positions.131 However, this is not necessarily the case in many
federal regimes.132 Responsibilities of subnational governors can range
from extensive to menial. The degree to which subnational track records
can aid in fostering political competition depends, in part, on whether
subnational governance is qualitatively comparable to national
governance. 133 The more that a track record demonstrates relevant
qualifications for national leadership, the more effective that track record
will be in fostering political competition. 134 It seems obvious that the more

129. The basic structure of the American system federal system is illustrative. The Tenth
Amendment reserves to the states all substantive policy responsibilities that are not expressly
delegated to the federal government. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
130. Subnational independence can no doubt help in shaping voter preferences. An honest
subnational leader, for example, may raise voter awareness regarding the extent of corruption at the
center. But this does not change the fact that underlying socioeconomic conditions usually dictate
election issues and the rules of a federal regime determine what sort of track record a subnational
leader is able to develop.
131. Myerson makes this assumption explicit when he discusses the possibility that local
government track records could have the same effect as provincial government track records. Myerson,
supra note 12, at 21. However, he seems to assume that provincial government responsibilities will
always be ―qualitatively comparable‖ to national responsibilities. Id.
132. See John Dinan, Patterns of Subnational Constitutionalism in Federal Countries, 39
RUTGERS L.J. 837 (2008) (exploring substantive competencies of subnational leadership in a variety of
different federal systems); Ronald L. Watts, Forward: States, Provinces, Länder, and Cantons:
International Variety Among Subnational Constitutions, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 941 (2000) (same).
133. Myerson, supra note 12, at 21.
134. Id.
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power subnational leaders have, the more valuable their track records will
be. Thus, the real-world applicability of Myerson‘s logic may depend on
its applicability to policy-based track records, which presumably reflect a
leader‘s positive ability to govern well rather than his ability to avoid
corruption.
C. Federalism as a Means of Moderating the Exigencies of Political
Transition
The model developed above is directed to the impediments to political
competition created by the information problems facing first-time voters in
an emerging democracy. Federalism can also promote political
competition by addressing other exigent circumstances such as the
problem of ―loyal opposition‖ and the need to avoid political stalemates
that will undermine government efficiency.135
Regarding the problem of loyal opposition, federalism, by definition,
creates separate legal spheres of governance. This creates the possibility
that opposition leaders can develop their own independent policies and
track records without coming into direct conflict with the majority
leadership. This creates a comfortable scenario for both opposition and
majority leadership because they are able to exert influence and develop
independent records without the appearance of direct confrontation, thus
diffusing any concerns regarding loyalty to democratic processes. 136
Regarding the urgent need for consensus and cooperation between
elites, federalism eliminates the zero-sum game created by a unitary
regime. In a unitary system, disputing groups are faced with an all-ornothing scenario: one party or coalition gets to decide all substantive
policy issues via the central government. By creating separate spheres of
governance, federalism diffuses this dangerous power dichotomy and
creates the possibility that some issues and policies can be devolved to
subnational governance where opposition parties may have more
consolidated support. Providing opposition parties with an independent

135. See supra Part II.A discussing these issues.
136. Dahl seems to have recognized federalism‘s potential in this regard back in 1965. Dahl
observed that ―constitutional separation of powers and federalism both create a variety of alternative
sites and reduce the possibility of an all-or-nothing victory through elections; hence both tend to
decrease the relative importance of electoral encounters . . . .‖ Dahl, supra note 29, at 350. Dahl
concluded, however, that federalism impeded political competition by reducing electoral stakes. Id. at
351. The application here is that federalism can facilitate competition in emerging democracies
because reducing electoral stakes creates a counter-incentive for the dominant party to quash all
opposition. It is also worth nothing that Dahl‘s idea has gone largely unnoticed and undeveloped since
1965.
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sphere of governance can actually facilitate consolidation by channeling
them into subnational democratic institutions rather than alienating them
from the new political order entirely. However, this solution also promotes
competition because it gives opposition parties a simultaneous opportunity
to demonstrate to the public that their policies and leadership are efficient
and trustworthy.
These possibilities reduce incentives for the dominant party to quash all
political opposition because they create an alternative: decentralization.
Obviously, this model works effectively only if opposition parties are able
to obtain control of at least one subnational unit. The crucial theoretical
point, however, is that federalism creates a possible compromise that is
impossible in a unitary regime.137
IV. SOUTH AFRICA‘S FEDERAL STRUCTURE AND CHARACTER-BASED
TRACK RECORDS
The remaining sections explore whether South Africa‘s federal
structure is conducive to promoting political competition pursuant to the
above model and, if so, whether South Africa‘s experience provides
empirical support for the model‘s theoretical claims. This section
considers whether the rules governing South Africa‘s federal system allow
for subnational politicians to develop character-based track records that
could facilitate political competition pursuant to Myerson‘s model. The
section first analyzes the formal election rules and the rules governing the
relationship between national and subnational leadership. It then considers
some open empirical issues and strategic alternatives regarding those rules
that may impact the effectiveness of Myerson‘s model.
A. South Africa’s Electoral System
South Africa‘s electoral system can likely accommodate subnational
character-based track records. South Africa‘s federal structure consists of
three basic levels of government: national, provincial, and local. 138
Political powers at all levels derive from and are circumscribed by the

137. I have previously examined South Africa as a test case for a variant of this theory and
explored the precise circumstances under with it is most likely to be effective in promoting democratic
consolidation. See Marshfield, supra note 24, at 625–29. Thus, I do not revisit this empirical research
here. Rather, the remainder of this Article explores whether South Africa‘s experience presents
evidence of the voter-based model of political competition developed above.
138. See generally I.M. RAUTENBACH & E.F.J. MALHERBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 268–70 (4th
ed. 2004) (providing overview of South Africa‘s federal structure).
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National Constitution (NC).139 The NC creates nine provinces and
establishes legislative and parliamentary-executive branches in each
province. 140 Local government consists of 300 municipalities that are
governed by Municipal Councils.141 The national legislature (Parliament)
is bicameral and composed of the National Assembly and the National
Council of the Provinces (NCOP). 142 The NCOP consists of delegates
from the provinces and exists exclusively to represent provincial interests
in the national legislative process. 143 The national government further
consists of a parliamentary-executive and an independent judiciary.144
South Africa has a parliamentary, party-based electoral system.
National and provincial elections are held concurrently every five years. 145
Municipal elections are held separately every five years.146 Registered
political parties may contest the national election; any or all of the

139. Rassie Malherbe & Dirk Brand, South Africa: Sub-National Constitutional Law, in
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, SUB -N ATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1, 48–65 (Andre Alen, et al. eds., 2001) (describing South Africa as a devolutionary federal
system where residual powers belong to national government); see also In re Certification of the
Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal 1996 (11) BCLR 1419 (CC) para. 14 (S. Afr.) (holding
that provinces are ―recipients and not the source of power.‖).
140. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 103(1) (establishing nine provinces); id. § 104 (establishing
provincial legislative branches); id. § 125 (establishing provincial executive branches). The provinces
are not permitted to have their own judicial branches. In re Certification of the Constitution of the
Province of KwaZulu-Natal 1996 (11) BCLR 1419 (CC) para. 33 (S. Afr.). Provinces are permitted to
adopt constitutions, but this is largely a formality because the National Constitution establishes all the
―particulars‖ necessary for provincial government to function and does not permit Provincial
Constitutions to deviate from the NC‘s design in any significant way. RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE,
supra note 138, at 244 n.22; see In re Certification of the Constitution of the Western Cape 1997 (9)
BCLR 1167 (CC) para. 15 (S. Afr.) (―[The NC] provides a complete blueprint for the regulation of
government within provinces which proves adequately for the establishment and functioning of
provincial legislatures and executives.‖).
141. The NC requires Parliament to provide for a national system of local governance. S. AFR .
CONST., 1996 § 151(1). The boundaries and particulars of local government are laid out in the Local
Government: Municipal Structures Act and the Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act. See
RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 280–81.
142. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 42.
143. Id. §§ 60–72.
144. Id. §§ 83–102 (executive); id. §§ 165–80 (judiciary).
145. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 49 (election of Parliament to five-year terms); id. § 108 (election of
provincial legislatures for five-year terms). The NC allows for Parliament and provincial legislatures
to be dissolved separately by a majority vote of the respective bodies if the dissolving body has been in
service for at least three years. Id. § 109 (dissolution of provincial legislatures); id. § 50 (dissolution of
Parliament). An election must be held within ninety (90) days of dissolution. Id. § 108 (election after
dissolution of provincial legislatures); id. § 49 (election after dissolution of Parliament). Thus, it is
possible that provincial and national elections could be held separately. However, because dissolution
is only likely to occur as a result of coalition governments, which in turn implies meaningful political
competition, the Article treats this possibility as too remote while the ANC retains a stronghold on
Parliament.
146. The NC provides that municipal government may be elected to five-year terms but allows
Parliament to shorten the term. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 159.
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provincial or municipal elections; or any combination of municipal,
provincial, or national elections. Before an election, registered political
parties must submit official candidate lists for each election that the party
will contest.147 Each candidate list must identify candidates in the order of
the party‘s preference. 148 The NC prohibits candidates from holding
positions in both the National Assembly and a provincial legislature.149
On election day for national and provincial governments, voters receive
separate national and provincial ballots. 150 The ballots display a list of
registered political parties with a corresponding picture of the parties‘
first-choice candidate.151 Voters cast a single vote for a political party at
the national level and a separate vote for a single party at the provincial
level. 152 The 400 seats in the National Assembly are assigned based on a
constituency system. 153 There are ten constituencies: one for each of the
nine provinces and one assigned to the national vote at large. 154 The
provincial constituencies receive 200 seats, which are divided
proportionally among the provinces based on population. 155 The remaining
200 seats are assigned to parties based on their proportional share of the
national vote at large.156
Seats in the provincial legislatures are assigned based solely on the
number of provincial-ballot votes each party received.157 Municipal
council seats are similarly assigned based on the number of municipalballot votes each party received. 158 Seats at all levels of government are
filled by the individuals identified on the parties‘ candidate lists in the
order listed by the parties.159
147. The ―list system‖ is established by national legislation (the Electoral Act). The NC requires
only that election rules be based on a ―national common voters roll[],‖ ―provide[] for a minimum
voting age of 18 years,‖ and ―result[], in general, in proportional representation.‖ S. AFR . CONST.,
1996 § 46; see RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 120–21 (describing the particulars of
the electoral rules).
148. RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 120.
149. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 158.
150. See Murray Faure, Elections for Parliament and the Provinces in the New South Africa:
1994–2004, 2 AFR. ASS‘ N POL. SCI. 70, 72–75 (1997).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 120.
154. Id. at 120–21.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. This is prescribed by national legislation. Id. at 246.
158. Id. at 280–81. Local government may also include ―participation‖ by certain non-elected
traditional leaders. See id. at 270–71. However, a local government body may not consist of more than
20% traditional leadership. Id. at 271, 281.
159. RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 120–21. Municipalities may choose to
operate under a ―ward system‖ rather than the ―list system.‖ Id. at 281.
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The National Assembly elects one of its members to serve as the
President and may remove the President by a vote of no-confidence. 160
Provincial legislatures similarly elect one of their members to be Premier
and may remove the Premier by a vote of no-confidence.161 The National
Assembly and provincial legislatures serve for concurrent five-year terms,
unless dissolved by a vote of no-confidence. 162 The President and
provincial Premiers must be reelected at the beginning of every legislative
term and no individual may serve more than two consecutive terms as
Premier or President.163
The Constitution does not provide for either the President or Parliament
to directly remove provincial officials from office. 164 However, the
national executive may intervene in provincial administration if a
provincial executive fails to ―fulfill an executive obligation in terms of the
Constitution or legislation.‖165 The national executive may issue a
directive ordering compliance or may assume responsibility for the
obligation directly if necessary to protect national interests. 166 This
mechanism could conceivably allow a corrupt national executive to
exercise authority over an honest provincial executive. 167 Provincial
government exercises considerably more control over municipal
government, but municipal council members are nevertheless separately
elected and not subject to removal by provincial or national leadership. 168
Viewed in total, South Africa‘s federal system would seem to allow for
independent subnational character-based track records as envisioned by
Myerson. National and subnational leaders are separately elected for fixed
terms, may not be removed by national leadership, and are not directly
responsible to national leadership. Additionally, the National Assembly‘s
constituency-based electoral system means that opposition parties can gain
more seats in the National Assembly if their support is consolidated within
particular provinces rather than spread evenly over the country at large.

160. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 86, 102.
161. Id. § 128.
162. See supra note 145.
163. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 88 (president); id. § 130 (premier).
164. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 105, 108, 128 (providing that provincial officials are separately
elected to five-year terms unless they are dissolved by a vote of no-confidence); RAUTENBACH &
MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 267 (discussing national government‘s limited powers of intervention
regarding provincial government).
165. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 100(1); see RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 267.
166. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 100(1).
167. Myerson, supra note 12, at 21 (discussing how mechanisms for imposing pressure on
subnational leaders can affect their independence and dull incentives for building independent track
records).
168. RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 276–77.
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This would seem to provide an additional incentive for opposition parties
to develop strong provincial and municipal track records. In light of
growing suspicion regarding the integrity of the ANC and that of its top
leaders, this may prove to be a valuable feature of South Africa‘s federal
structure.169 In fact, as discussed in Part VIII below, opposition parties
capitalized on this structural feature during the 2009 election.
B. Strategic Alternatives Affecting Myerson’s Model
South Africa‘s electoral rules nevertheless present opposition parties
with several strategic alternatives that may affect their ability to foster
independent character-based track records. For example, opposition parties
must decide whether to list their most prominent leader as a candidate for
the National Assembly or as a candidate for a particular provincial
legislature.170 In light of the ANC‘s majority in the National Assembly,
opposition leaders will have little or no real power in the National
Assembly. Under Myerson‘s model, a more prudent strategy for
opposition parties is to focus on obtaining a majority in a provincial
legislature. This would enable them to exercise power independent of the
ANC and develop an independent provincial track record. 171 This requires
opposition party leadership to resist the prestige of the National Assembly
and concentrate on a long-term reputation-building strategy within a lowprofile provincial legislature.
This is a choice that most regional opposition parties have been unable
to make. For example, in 1994, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) sent
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, its internationally known leader, to the National
Assembly even though it anticipated winning a majority in the KwaZuluNatal legislature and the ANC was sure to win a majority in the National
Assembly. 172 That same year, President de Kerk‘s National Party (NP)

169. See Jonathan Hyslop, Political Corruption: Before and After Apartheid, 31 J. S. AFR. STUD.
773, 789 (2005) (examining extent and nature of corruption in post-apartheid South Africa).
170. Only ninety percent (90%) of a party‘s listed candidates for a provincial legislature need to
reside within that province. R AUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 246 n.1.
171. This strategy is viable only if the opposition party has consolidated support within specific
provinces such that it can obtain a majority in those provincial legislatures. The Congress of the People
(COPE), for example, which finished third in the 2009 national election, did not win control of any
provincial legislatures. See IEC Results, supra note 3; see also infra Part VIII.B–C (discussing the
geographic distribution of COPE‘s constituency).
172. This was particularly ironic because the IFP was the dominant proponent for decentralization
during the constitutional negotiations and the KwaZulu-Natal legislature became the venue for a
regime-threatening conflict between the IFP and ANC between 1994 and 1996. Marshfield, supra note
24, at 632–38 (discussing the role of the KwaZulu-Natal provincial legislature in the negotiated
transition to democracy).
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faced similar prospects regarding its success in the Western Cape
provincial legislature. The NP nevertheless sent de Klerk to the National
Assembly. 173 However, in 2009, the Democratic Alliance (DA) became
the first party to list its president as a candidate for a provincial legislature
(Western Cape) rather than the National Assembly. 174 Indeed, it appears
that the DA has adopted a deliberate strategy to build a strong provincial
track record upon which to challenge the ANC in the 2014 election. 175
These examples illustrate that South Africa‘s electoral system provides
opposition parties with an important strategic decision, which represents
an added variable affecting whether Myerson‘s model is likely to play out
constructively in South Africa.
C. Open Empirical Questions Affecting Myerson’s Model
South Africa‘s electoral rules also raise various empirical questions
that bring into question whether Myerson‘s model is likely to materialize
in South Africa.
First, Myerson‘s model would seem to work most effectively in a
presidential rather than parliamentary system. The model works best when
voters are keenly dialed in to the character of the leader for whom they are
voting. Although party reputations surely play a role in voter choice in
presidential systems, a candidate‘s individual reputation would seem to be
more at issue in a presidential system than in a parliamentary system. In a
parliamentary system, the primary focus is the party‘s collective
reputation, which, because of its corporate nature, is more difficult for
voters to track and is more malleable by the party.176 Additionally, in a

173. De Klerk and Buthelezi‘s involvement in the first national government was incredibly
symbolic. In an effort to set the tone for reconciliation and cooperation, the ANC agreed to a provision
in the Interim Constitution that extended executive cabinet posts to any opposition party that obtained
twenty or more seats in the National Assembly. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993 § 88. De Klerk and
Buthelezi both assumed posts in Nelson Mandela‘s cabinet. This cooperation between three previously
bitter rivals was extraordinary. These circumstances perhaps explain and justify the NP and IFP‘s
decisions to send their prominent leaders to the national government rather than focus on provincial
track records.
174. See infra Part VIII.B–C (discussing DA‘s opposition strategies in the 2009 election).
175. See Democratic Alliance, A Strong Track Record in Government, http://www.da.org.za/
campaigns.htm?action=view-page&category=6592 (last visited Feb. 28, 2011). This was also the
stated strategy of the DA‘s predecessor, the Democratic Party. See Adam Habib & Lubna Nadvi, Party
Disintegrations & Re-Alignments in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 29 REV. OF AFR . POL. ECON. 331
(2002).
176. Myerson discusses a variation on his model that accounts for voters‘ inability to observe
corruption in leaders. See Myerson, supra note 12, at 18. This variation is somewhat analogous to the
point here. Myerson‘s variation deals primarily with the idea that corruption can be hidden by leaders,
but the decrease in voter welfare will serve as a proxy for leader corruption. Id. The point is that
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presidential system, voters are the primary means of holding individual
executives accountable. Executives receive their mandate from the voters
and, consequently, structure their campaigns around voter preferences.
Thus, if voters demand integrity, executive candidates will have to proffer
evidence of personal integrity. In a parliamentary system, however, the
executive is accountable primarily to the majority party or coalition that
controls the legislature, and party support is often driven by patronage, not
personal integrity.
This disconnect between the voters and the executive could dull the
incentives that are so crucial to Myerson‘s model. Executives in a
parliamentary system may have less of an incentive to develop a strong
character-based track record, because their success is tied directly to party
rather than voter support. Thus, they may actually tend toward corruption
in order to curry political favor within the party. Likewise, voters in a
parliamentary system may find it more difficult to isolate culpability for
corruption since campaigns are structured around the collective reputation
of the party rather than individual candidates.
Perhaps anticipating this criticism of his model, Myerson notes in a
parenthetical that his model will nevertheless work in a parliamentary
system ―provided that . . . leadership selection is understood as the primary
function of parliamentary elections.‖177 This caveat is not unrealistic. Even
in a parliamentary system, if voters demand virtue from their leaders,
political parties will have an incentive to elect individuals that have
reputations for honesty and to expel corrupt leaders from the party.
South Africa‘s electoral rules are configured to promote this because
they require parties to list all candidates in order of preference before any
election.178 Party reputations are therefore publicly linked to the individual
reputations of the listed candidates—particularly the reputation of the firstchoice candidate, who is presumably the party‘s selection for President or
Premier. Nevertheless, the legislature‘s ultimate selection for Premier or
President is never certain and the majority party can remove the President
or Premier at any time by a no-confidence vote.
Thus, the parliamentary nature of South Africa‘s electoral system raises
the empirical question of how tight the nexuses are between candidates‘

parliamentary systems create an added layer between voters and corruption that could make it more
difficult for voters to track culpability and easier for parties to mask corruption. It is a variation on the
agency problem flagged by Myerson.
177. Id. at 11.
178. This requirement is strictly enforced by the Independent Electoral Commission. See ANC,
DA and COPE make candidate list cut-off, MAIL & G UARDIAN, Mar. 2, 2009, available at http://www.
mg.co.za/article/2009-03-02-anc-and-da-make-candidate-list-cutoff.
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personal track records, collective reputations of political parties, and
public choice regarding parliamentary elections. If these connections are
weak and voters do not see executive ―leadership selection as the primary
function of parliamentary elections,‖ 179 Myerson‘s character-based model
may break down, or, at the very least, the incentives will be less
pronounced.
A second empirical issue that affects Myerson‘s model in South Africa
is whether holding concurrent national and provincial elections affects
voters‘ tendency to cast their subnational vote independent of their
national vote. 180 As described below, the provinces‘ substantive policymaking authority is nominal, and most high-profile issues are decided at
the national level. 181 This means that national elections can easily
dominate provincial elections. An important empirical question is whether
voters can critically evaluate provincial candidates in their own right or
whether voter preferences regarding the national election tend to dictate
how voters cast their provincial vote. The party-based parliamentary
system may also play a role here, because it is easy to imagine that voters
will have difficulty identifying a credible basis for splitting their
provincial and national ballots between different political parties. 182
Myerson‘s model only works if voters cast their national and subnational
votes independently. South Africa‘s concurrent electoral system may
result in a de facto blending of national and provincial votes
notwithstanding the formality of separate ballots.
A third empirical question is whether national prosecution of provincial
leadership could effectively squelch any independent provincial track
records.183 Neither the President nor the National Assembly has authority
to directly remove a provincial representative or Premier from office.
However, the President‘s cabinet is vested with significant discretion and

179. Myerson, supra note 12, at 11.
180. It is interesting that during the negotiated transition from apartheid to democracy, the ANC
advocated for a single-ballot electoral system. Andrew Reynolds, South Africa: Electoral System
Design and Conflict Management, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL
ASSISTANCE, http://www.idea.int/esd/upload/south_africa.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2011). Under the
ANC‘s proposal, provincial and national representation would have been determined by a single vote
for a single political party. This proposal was a transparent strategic move by the ANC to take
advantage of its national dominance. Id. at 69–70. The ANC‘s position was ultimately rejected in favor
of the split-ballot system described above. Id. at 70. Significantly, results from the 1994 election
showed that many voters did in fact split their national and provincial votes between parties. Id.
181. See infra Parts V–VI.
182. There is some empirical evidence that voters split their votes. See Reynolds, supra note 180,
at 69–70 (analyzing results from the 1994 election).
183. Myerson raises this as a possible empirical issue affecting his model. Myerson, supra note
12, at 21.
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ultimate authority regarding criminal prosecution of government
corruption.184 Provincial leadership is not immune from investigation and
prosecution by national law-enforcement and intelligence agencies. 185
Findings from a recent report regarding government corruption and
prosecution in South Africa do not suggest that the national government
has systematically used this power as a means of eliminating political
competition.186 Nevertheless, the possibility of strategic prosecutions by
national leadership of subnational competition exists under South Africa‘s
structure. This sort of behavior could affect the real-world independence
of subnational leaders to challenge national leadership through the
development of subnational track records.
V. THE PROVINCES‘ LAW-MAKING AUTHORITY AND POLICY-BASED
TRACK RECORDS
South Africa‘s federal structure may also allow subnational leaders to
develop policy-based track records. As noted above, the key to expanding
the model to policy-based track records is that the subnational units retain
a degree of independence from the national government on issues that can
be used to mount a meaningful campaign against national leadership. 187
This section explores the degree to which South Africa‘s federal structure
may be able to accommodate this broader theory of political competition
within federal systems.
A. The Provinces’ Formal Law-Making Authority
The ability of provincial leaders to develop policy-based track records
is significantly limited by the fact that the provinces have almost no
independent policy-making or taxing authority. Provincial legislatures
may only make laws concerning specific issues listed in the NC. 188 The
NC lists only twelve rather insignificant substantive areas where the

184. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 179(6).
185. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME: REGIONAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH AFRICA & SOUTH
AFRICAN DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE AND ADMINISTRATION, COUNTRY CORRUPTION REPORT:
SOUTH AFRICA (April 2003) (describing the prosecutorial structure in South Africa).
186. Id. at 52–54 (presenting statistics regarding corruption prosecutions without any suspicious
regional patterns or marked increase in prosecutions).
187. See supra Part III.B (discussing this in terms of three variables: institutional independence,
voter priorities, and qualitatively comparable responsibilities).
188. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 104; In re Certification of the Constitution of the Province of
KwaZulu-Natal 1996 (11) BCLR 1419 at (CC) para. 14 (S. Afr.); see Marshfield, supra note 24, at
590–95 (providing detailed legal analysis of provinces‘ law-making authority).
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provinces have exclusive law-making authority. 189 The three most notable
powers are the regulation of liquor licenses, roads, and land use
planning. 190 However, Parliament may override provincial legislation in
any of these areas if ―necessary‖ to ―maintain economic unity,‖ ―maintain
essential national standards,‖ or ―to prevent unreasonable action taken by a
province which is prejudicial to another province or to the country as a
whole.‖191 The Constitutional Court has interpreted these requirements
liberally and universally upheld preemptive national legislation.192
The NC provides a more generous list of issues over which provincial
legislatures and Parliament have concurrent law-making authority. 193
Some of the more significant issues on the list include education, the
environment, health services, and welfare services.194 Provinces may enact
laws in these areas, but Parliament has complete discretion to preempt any
provincial law with national legislation.195 Provinces therefore have
absolutely no formal independence on these issues. They are only
permitted to make law if the national leadership, by acquiescence, permits
them to do so.
A further practical limitation on the law-making authority of the
provinces is their inability to collect meaningful taxes. The provinces may
not assess any sales, property, income, or value-added tax.196 Provinces are
therefore dependent on distributions from the national government in order
to implement any laws that they make. 197 Parliament is constitutionally
required to provide provinces with funds sufficient to perform ―basic
services‖ and implement any national legislation that Parliament delegates
to provincial executives, which Parliament can do without limitation. 198
Thus, because the provinces are not entitled to any funding for

189. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 104, sched. 5, pt. A.
190. Id. Less notable powers include provincial sport, ―abattoirs,‖ ―provincial cultural matters,‖
and provincial archives. Id.
191. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 44(2).
192. Cape Metro. Council v. Minister of Prov. Affairs and Constitutional Dev. 1999 (11) BCLR
1229 (CC); Weare v. Ndebele NO 2009 (4) BCLR 370 (CC); Nhlabathi v. Fick 2003 (9) ZALCC
(LCC).
193. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 104, sched. 4, pt. A.
194. Id.
195. Id. §§ 104, 146–50.
196. Id. § 228.
197. Id. § 227(1)(a); see Tom Lodge, Provincial Government and State Authority in South Africa,
31 J. S. AFR. STUD. 738, 740–41 (2005) (discussing the provinces‘ dependence on national funds).
198. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 227(1)(a).
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independent provincial programs, they are very limited in their ability to
enact and implement meaningful provincial legislation. 199
This lack of substantive law-making independence suggests that South
Africa‘s structure cannot support a strict application of the model
developed here. Although the provinces certainly make substantive laws,
the provinces have no effective means of fending off national preemption.
Indeed, the system is purposefully set up to favor national legislation and
permit provinces to make law only as Parliament sees fit. 200 Parliament is
well within its constitutional authority to enact preemptive legislation,
impose burdensome national legislation that consumes provincial
resources, or simply withhold necessary funds so that provinces are unable
to enact meaningful legislation. All of these devices enable national
leadership to control whether a province can deviate from national policy
choices. Without independent authority to enact deviant policies,
subnational leaders cannot develop policy-based track records that
challenge the national leaders‘ incompetence. 201
B. The Provinces’ De Facto Policy-Making Independence as Illustrated
by the HIV/AIDS Controversy
The previous discussion assumes that national leadership is
consolidated and able to act unanimously in imposing national policy.
Under those circumstances, and if we assume that national leadership will
always preempt ―undesirable‖ subnational law, provincial leadership lacks
the ability to develop independent policy-based track records. However, if
the ANC were to be divided on a particular issue that would also be within
the province‘s law-making authority, then provinces could enjoy de facto
independence from national preemption and craft their own policy

199. See Lodge, supra note 197, at 740–41 (discussing financial limitations on independent
provincial policy).
200. In the words of the Constitutional Court, South Africa‘s ―constitutional structure . . . makes
provision for framework provisions to be set by the national sphere of government.‖ Cape Metro.
Council 1999 (11) BCLR 1229 (CC) para. 50.
201. It should be noted that this analysis focuses on the formal logic of the proposed model. The
point is that provinces have no means of fending off national preemption. According to the model, this
means that the national leaders will be able to squelch opposition track records, thus short-circuiting
the incentives necessary for the model to work. In reality, it is possible that the ANC could, for any
number of reasons, not want to preempt provincial authority even though provincial parties were
developing good track records. If the ANC were to exercise this sort of restraint because of some other
incentive, the model may still work. The point here, however, is that the formal rules of South Africa‘s
federal system do not guarantee the necessary level of independence for provinces to develop
independent policy-based track records. Part VIII below discusses the way that political opposition has
in fact developed in South Africa within the confines of this legal structure.
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solutions. This could have positive effects for political competition
because opposition parties would have the opportunity to demonstrate
their abilities to adopt and implement sound provincial policies on issues
of obvious public importance. 202 If these provincial policies were
successful, opposition parties would have a marketable policy-based track
record regarding a high-profile issue.
President Thabo Mbeki‘s controversial position on HIV/AIDS provides
a powerful illustration. 203 Beginning in 2002, President Mbeki took the
rather bizarre position that HIV was not proven to cause AIDS.204
President Mbeki therefore opposed government provisioning of
antiretroviral therapy to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV. 205 In
2002, under President Mbeki‘s leadership, the National Department of
Health adopted regulations that prohibited doctors from prescribing
antiretroviral drugs except to patients in designated research programs. 206
An advocacy group challenged the regulations in court, and, in 2002, the
Constitutional Court declared the restrictions to be unconstitutional and
required that the government make antiretroviral treatment generally
available. 207 Still divided over the issue, the ANC did not take adequate
national measures to fulfill this mandate. 208 However, because the Court‘s
ruling had freed the provinces from compliance with the now invalid
national regulations, various provinces, including the oppositioncontrolled Western Cape, instituted their own programs to ensure that
antiretroviral treatments were administered. 209
The ANC‘s policies have now been largely discredited, and during the
2009 election, the DA relied on its positive leadership and track record in
the Western Cape regarding the antiretroviral issue. 210 This strategy seems
to have been effective. Commenting on the run-up to the 2009 election, a

202. The argument assumes that the issues are of public importance because they were able to
gridlock the ruling party. Obviously, some issues could conceivably divide the party but not be of
public importance.
203. See Lodge, supra note 197, at 743–44 (discussing how the ANC‘s gridlock over HIV/AIDS
policy allowed provinces to exercise independence on the issue).
204. Mandisa Mbali, HIV/AIDS Policy-Making in Post-Apartheid South Africa, in STATE OF THE
NATION: SOUTH AFRICA 2003–2004, at 318 (John Daniel et al. eds., 2001).
205. Id. at 321–22. Mbeki cited unnecessary government expense and possible poisonous effects
of antiretroviral drugs as justifications for opposing government provision of antiviral treatment. Id.
206. Id. at 324; see DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, HIV/AIDS & STD STRATEGIC PLAN FOR SOUTH
AFRICA 2000–2005 (Feb. 2000), available at http://www.doh.gov.za/aids/index.html.
207. Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (10) BCLR 1075 (CC) (S. Afr.).
208. Lodge, supra note 197, at 743–44; see also AVERT, History of HIV & AIDS in South Africa,
http://www.avert.org/history-aids-south-africa.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
209. Lodge, supra note 197, at 743–44.
210. See DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE, DA MANIFESTO: ELECTION 2009 18 (2009).
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columnist wrote the following in a national newspaper: ―[T]he DA has a
good track record. Compare ANC with DA rule in the Western Cape and
Cape Town. Under the DA, the Western Cape rolled out antiretroviral
drugs when all the ANC-ruled provinces were denying that HIV causes
AIDS.‖211
The ANC‘s HIV/AIDS debacle demonstrates that South Africa‘s
federal structure can accommodate subnational policy track records that
can be used effectively to promote political competition. The key is that
the provinces have some form of independence from national policy. If
provincial policy is preempted, the model is short-circuited. Thus far,
ANC gridlock seems to be the only way that provinces gain any real
policy independence. Even then, provinces are free to enact deviant policy
only if no national policy exists—either because none was ever enacted or
existing policy was declared invalid by the Court.
VI. THE PROVINCES‘ ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY AND POLICY-BASED
TRACK RECORDS
Another way for the model to operate is for opposition parties to
develop sound track records for government administration even if they
are not able to develop independent substantive policy. This section
considers that application of the model under South Africa‘s federal
structure.
The provinces have significant administrative responsibility. Provincial
executives are exclusively responsible for implementing provincial law. 212
More importantly however, the NC provides that Parliament may require
provincial executives to administer national legislation irrespective of
whether the legislation falls within one of the province‘s enumerated
powers.213 Thus, Parliament may enlist provincial executives to administer
any national law. In practice, Parliament relies heavily on provincial
government to administer national law. In 1999, more than seventy-five
percent of all public servants were provincial officials.214 Furthermore, in
211. Andrew Kenny, It’s Got To Be The DA For Me, CITIZEN, Apr. 20, 2009 (on file with author).
212. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 125.
213. Id. Provincial executives have a standing obligation to implement national legislation that
falls within one of the provinces‘ enumerated powers. Id. at § 125(3). For a full discussion of some
further eccentricities regarding the relationship between national legislation and provincial executives,
see RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 259–60. The only restriction on Parliament‘s
assignment of administrative responsibilities to the provinces is that it must provide provinces with the
means necessary to perform assigned obligations. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 125(3).
214. Lodge, supra note 197, at 738.
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1999, more than forty-three percent of the country‘s overall revenue was
assigned to the provinces so that they could meet their administrative
responsibilities. 215 This means that provincial administration involves
significant responsibility and, consequently, the possibility of developing
meaningful independent track records depending on the degree of
independence from national control.
Premiers have a fair degree of independence regarding the structure
and appointment of their cabinets (Executive Councils). 216 The Premier
must appoint between five and ten provincial legislatures to serve on his or
her Executive Council.217 The Premier defines the responsibilities of each
member of the Council and may remove members unilaterally. 218 The only
exception to this is the position of Secretary which is established and
defined by national legislation. 219 The Premier may still appoint and
remove the Secretary unilaterally. A Premier may also unilaterally
reassign responsibilities among council members. 220 The provincial
legislature may remove the Premier, the Executive Council, or both by a
vote of no-confidence. 221 The national government does not have any
analogous authority to remove provincial executives.222
Administrative departments at both the national and provincial levels
are established and structured by national legislation. 223 Provinces have no
independent authority to restructure or alter provincial departments. 224
Provinces similarly have no authority regarding the staffing of provincial
departments.225 Instead, national legislation determines how provincial
departments are structured, what their respective mandates are, and how

215. Id. at 740 (percentage calculated based on revenue figures provided by Lodge).
216. See generally RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 261.
217. S. AFR . CONST., 1996, § 132(1). The Western Cape constitution provides for a larger cabinet.
See Dirk Brand, The Western Cape Provincial Constitution, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 961, 961 (2000). This is
significant because the Constitutional Court held that this change to provincial executive authority was
an exclusive executive power that could not be changed by national legislation unless it implicated a
pressing national interest. See In re Certification of the Constitution of the Western Cape 1997 (12)
BCLR 1653 (CC) para. 15 (S. Afr.). This confirms that provincial executives have significant
independence when it comes to the appointment and structure of their cabinets.
218. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 132(2).
219. See Premier of the Province of the Western Cape v. Pres. of the RSA 1999 (4) BCLR 383
(CC) paras. 71–72 (S. Afr.) (discussing the various national statutes that govern the role of the
provincial Secretary).
220. See RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 261 (citing Montshioa v. Motshegare
2001 (8) BCLR 833 (B) at 930 (S. Afr.).
221. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 §§ 109, 141.
222. Id. § 141; RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 216–62.
223. See Premier of the Province of the Western Cape 1999 (4) BCLR 383 (CC) paras. 1, 5 (S.
Afr.) (describing the structure of administrative departments).
224. RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 262 n.167.
225. Id.
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they are staffed. Salaries for public servants employed in the provincial
departments are also set by national legislation but must be paid by the
provinces. 226
Nevertheless, despite the provinces‘ inability to restructure and staff
administrative departments, provincial departments are ultimately
managed by the Premier and his or her Executive Council. 227 National
government does not have authority to interfere with this responsibility
unless the province is so derelict in its duties that national interests and
basic services are threatened.228 Thus, provinces maintain a degree of
management oversight that could form the basis for an independent
administrative track record.
Although Premiers cannot formally restructure administrative
departments, they can establish a variety of management policies and
protocols that affect the delivery of government services. They can also
tackle the pervasive skills deficit that plagues provincial public servants
and disrupts delivery of government services. 229 Thus, Premiers have the
independent authority to develop well-trained and efficient provincial
departments. And because national law vests provincial government with
substantial administrative responsibilities and provides them with large
amounts of money to fulfill these responsibilities, provinces have a
genuine opportunity to develop sound administrative track records
regarding incredibly important and high-profile issues such as healthcare,
education, and welfare.230 There is no reason why independent
administrative track records of this sort could not trigger constructive
political competition at the national level pursuant to the model. 231
VII. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AND INDEPENDENT TRACK RECORDS
South Africa‘s federal structure allows for municipal track records to
promote political competition at the national level. South Africa has over

226. Lodge, supra note 197, at 741.
227. Premier of the Province of the Western Cape 1999 (4) BCLR 383 (CC) paras. 71–72 (S.
Afr.). National Legislation provides that the Executive Council Secretary (also known as the Director
General) is the head of provincial administrative departments. Id.
228. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 100(1).
229. See Lodge, supra note 197, at 739–40 (discussing skills deficit in provincial administration).
230. See id. at 741 (discussing the responsibilities that provinces have to administer service
delivery in those areas).
231. See, e.g., Michael Trapido, W Cape: Zille’s Chance to Show the Other Provinces How It’s
Done?, MAIL & GUARDIAN, Apr. 28, 2009, http://www.thoughtleader.co.za/traps/2009/04/28/westerncape-zille‘s-chance-to-show-8-other-provinces-a-prototype-for-success/ (stating hope that the
opposition‘s new administration in the Western Cape will implement administrative polices that will
improve delivery of government services and spur political competition).
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300 local government institutions.232 The substantive powers of local
government are a strict subset of the powers assigned to provincial
government and subject to the same national preemption principles that
apply to provincial government. 233 By and large, therefore, most local
government activities are dominated by provincial and national
government policies and practices.234
National legislation establishes unique municipal governments for the
country‘s six major metropolitan areas.235 These municipalities enjoy
exclusive executive authority within their jurisdictions and the subset of
provincial powers assigned to them. 236 Because of the size and economic
significance of these metropolitan areas, their municipal governments have
significant administrative responsibilities regarding delivery of crucial
government services. Furthermore, because their municipal council
members are separately elected, political parties may be able to use
municipal government positions to develop positive administrative and
character-based track records as in the provincial context. As noted above,
a key issue in the municipal context is whether the responsibilities of local
government are ―qualitatively comparable‖ to provincial and national
responsibilities. 237 On this point, South Africa‘s federal rules seem to
provide sufficient independence for municipal governments, at least in the
six major metropolitan areas, such that the model could apply. 238

232. RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 286.
233. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 151-64; RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 276–79.
234. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 139 (providing for provincial intervention in local government);
RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 276 (―Parliament and the provinces exercise extensive
control over local government.‖).
235. RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 286–87 (describing provisions of the Local
Government: Municipal Structures Act). The six metropolitan municipalities are the City of Cape
Town, Ekurhuleni Metropolitan (East Rand), eThekwini Metropolitan (Durban), the City of
Johannesburg, Nelson Mandela Bay (Port Elizabeth), and the City of Tshwane (Pretoria).
236. See id. at 297.
237. See supra Part III.B.3; Myerson, supra note 12, at 21.
238. Indeed, as discussed further below, the DA has relied heavily on their president‘s, Helen
Zille‘s, record as the mayor of Cape Town where she won the 2008 World Mayor Award. See Cape
Town Mayor Helen Zille, WORLD MAYOR, http://www.worldmayor.com/contest_2008/world-mayor2008-zille.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2011). Interestingly, the ANC majority in the National Assembly
moved without notice to block a motion by the DA to recognize Zille‘s award. Id. The then-ANCcontrolled Western Cape legislature also sought to ―downgrade the city mayor‘s post to a ceremonial
role and distribute the executive powers among the city council itself.‖ Id.

340

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 10:297

VIII. REAL POLITICAL COMPETITION AND SUBNATIONAL TRACK
RECORDS IN SOUTH AFRICA
Having examined the rules of South Africa‘s federal regime, this
Article now turns to the reality of post-apartheid politics in South Africa to
determine whether South Africa‘s federal structure is actually fostering
political competition, as the model would suggest. South Africa‘s 2009
general election presents promising signs for political competition in
South Africa and provides compelling support for the real-world
applicability of the policy-based model of political competition herein.
A. The ANC’s Dominance from 1994 to 2004
The first decade of post-apartheid politics was clearly dominated by the
ANC. In 1994, during the country‘s first democratic election, the ANC
won 63% of the national vote and 252 of the 400 seats in the National
Assembly. 239 Two opposition parties, the NP and the IFP won significant
representation in the National Assembly. The NP won 82 seats and the IFP
won 43 seats.240 The ANC won control of all but two of the provincial
legislatures.241 The NP won control of the Western Cape by a slim margin,
winning 23 of the possible 42 seats. 242 The IFP won control of the
KwaZulu-Natal legislature, winning 41 of the possible 81 seats.243 In the
provincial legislatures of both the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, the
ANC was the second place vote-getter.244
In 1999, the ANC increased its majority in the National Assembly by
winning 66% of the national vote and taking 266 of the 400 seats. 245 Three
major opposition parties competed in the 1999 election. The newly formed
Democratic Party (DP) took 38 National Assembly seats, the IFP took 34
seats, and the New National Party took 28 seats.246 Most significantly, the
ANC defeated the New National Party in the Western Cape legislature and
closed to within two seats of the IFP in the KwaZulu-Natal legislature.247

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

See IEC Results, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
The ANC won 14 of the 42 seats. Id.
Id.
Id.
IEC Results, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
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In 2004, the ANC obtained its largest majority in the National
Assembly by winning 279 of the 400 seats, representing 70% of the
national vote. 248 The ANC also defeated the IFP in the KwaZulu-Natal
legislature.249 However, the ANC did not win a majority in the Western
Cape legislature, and it was forced to form a coalition with an opposition
party, the DP.250 The DP‘s strength in the Western Cape legislature set the
stage for it to gain enough support to successfully oppose the ANC‘s illfated HIV/AIDS policies, 251 and this prudent policy ultimately gave the
DP a tremendous amount of political capital leading into the 2009
election.
B. Evidence of Opposition Success in 2009
In 2009, the ANC won 264 of the 400 seats in the National
Assembly. 252 The DA won 67 seats, the Congress of the People (COPE)
won 30 seats, and the IFP claimed 18 seats.253 This means that the ANC
can afford to lose as many as 63 seats without losing control of the
national government or being forced to form a majority coalition. Table 1
below shows the four major parties‘ respective shares of the 400 seats in
the National Assembly by provincial and national constituencies. The
provincial constituency distributions show that the only party with
consolidated provincial support is the DA. It won the majority of the
Western Cape‘s National Assembly seats and was close behind the ANC‘s
majority in both Gauteng and the Eastern Cape. No other opposition party
challenged the ANC significantly in any other provincial constituency.

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part VI.B (discussing the HIV/AIDS controversy).
See IEC Results, supra note 3.
See id. This gave the ANC an unsurprising 65.9% majority. Id.
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TABLE 1: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SEATS BY CONSTITUENCY254
PROVINCIAL CONSTITUENCY SEATS

NATIONAL
CONSTITUENCY
SEATS

EC

FS

Ga

KZN

Li

Mp

NW

NC

WC

TOTAL

ANC

126

19

9

31

36

17

14

11

3

8

264

DA

--255

6

4

19

7

2

2

2

2

23

67

COPE

16

3

1

4

1

1

1

1

1

2

30

IFP

9

1

8

PARTY

18

At the provincial level, the ANC won control of all provincial
legislatures except for the Western Cape, where the DA narrowly defeated
the ANC.256 Table 2 shows the party distribution of all provincial
legislative seats won in the 2009 election. This distribution again shows
that the Western Cape was the only province vulnerable to opposition
control. The IFP retains consolidated but weakening support within
KwaZulu-Natal. COPE appears to have more support in the Eastern Cape
and Gauteng, but it is not yet a legitimate threat to the ANC‘s majority in
either of those provinces.

254. Data taken from Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, Seat Assignment
National Assembly, http://www.elections.org.za/(click ―Elections‖; then ―Results‖) (last visited Feb.
28, 2011).
255. The DA did not submit a national constituency list of candidates. It nevertheless received its
proportional share of candidates based on the national vote at large, but its national constituency seats
were filled by candidates from its provincial candidate lists. See RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra
note 138, at 121–29 (explaining relevant electoral rules in this scenario).
256. See IEC Results, supra note 3.
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TABLE 2: PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE SEATS BY PARTY257
PARTY

PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE SEATS
EC

FS

Ga

KZN

Li

Mp

NW

NC

WC

ANC

44

22

47

51

43

27

25

19

14

DP

6

3

16

7

2

2

3

4

22

COPE

9

4

6

1

4

1

3

5

3

IFP

1

18

Independent Democrats

1

2

2

United Democratic
Movement

3

African Christian
Democratic Party

1

Minority Front

1

1

2

Freedom Front Plus

1

1

United Christian
Democratic Party

2

African Independent
Congress

1

TOTAL

63

30

73

80

49

30

33

30

42

Regarding municipal government, there are 300 local governments. In
2006, the last local government election, the ANC won control of 203
municipalities.258 The IFP won twenty-six municipalities, almost
exclusivity within scarcely populated rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal.259 The
DA won seven municipalities. 260 Most importantly, however, the ANC
won five of the six major metropolitan municipalities. 261 The DA‘s victory
in Cape Town was the only significant opposition victory in local

257. Data taken from Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, Seat Assignment
Provincial Legislatures, http://www.elections.org.za/(click ―Elections‖; then ―Results‖) (last visited
Feb. 28, 2011).
258. Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2006 Local Government Elections,
http://www.elections.org.za/ (click ―Elections‖; then ―Results‖) (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.; see supra note 235 (listing the six metropolitan municipalities).

344

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 10:297

government. COPE was not formed until 2008 and therefore did not
compete in the 2006 municipal elections.
C. Analysis and Opposition Strategies for 2014
The Article now explores whether the model could benefit any of the
three major opposition parties as they are situated following the recent
2009 election. This section is not intended to be a complete sociopolitical
analysis. Instead, it explores some of the real-world possibilities of the
model for purposes of illustrating its practical value and limitations. The
inquiry is therefore limited to this question: do opposition parties have any
real opportunities to develop subnational track records that they could use
against the ANC in the 2014 general election?
Of the three major opposition parties, COPE appears to be least likely
to develop a subnational track record. COPE does not have control of any
provincial or municipal governments. Although local government
elections will take place in 2011, it is unlikely that COPE will win control
of any of the six major metropolitan municipalities. Thus, COPE is
unlikely to have any opportunity to develop a subnational track record of
any kind that it could use against the ANC in the 2014 national elections.
The IFP, on the other hand, seems to be operating in reverse under the
model. The IFP‘s support base has traditionally been contained within
KwaZulu-Natal.262 It won control of the province after the first democratic
election in 1994.263 However, its support within the province has steadily
dropped since then. In 1999, after five years of IFP control, the ANC came
within less than two percentage points of beating the IFP. 264 The ANC
ultimately took control of the province in 2004 and retained control in
2009.265 Since taking power, the ANC has been relentless in exposing the

262. See ANTHEA JEFFERY, THE NATAL STORY: 16 YEARS OF CONFLICT (1997).
263. See IEC Results, supra note 3 (the IFP won 41 of the 81 seats but formed a coalition with
minority parties to gain control independent of the ANC); KWAZULU-N ATAL MONITORING PROJECT,
KwaZulu-Natal’s New Constitution: No Losers . . . Any Winners?, 1996 KWAZULU-N ATAL BRIEFING
1, 2 (explaining how the IFP won more votes than any other party and obtained control over the
legislature by forming a coalition with minority parties).
264. Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, Provincial Elections ’99, KwaZuluNatal Results, http://www.elections.org.za/ (click ―Elections‖; then ―Results‖) (last visited Feb. 28,
2011).
265. Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, Provincial Elections ’04, KwaZuluNatal Results, http://www.elections.org.za/ (click ―Elections‖; then ―Results‖) (last visited Feb. 28,
2011); Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, Provincial Elections ’09, KwaZulu-Natal
Results, http://www.elections.org.za/content/uploadedFiles/2009%20National%20and%20Provincial%
20Election%20candidate%20lists.pdf?n=9151 (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
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IFP‘s apparent incompetence and corruption while in office. 266 Thus, the
IFP seems to have squandered an opportunity to develop a sound
subnational track record that it could have used to challenge the ANC at
the national level. Its poor track record and 2009 defeat nevertheless lend
support to the notion that conditions within South Africa can support the
model. 267
In contrast to COPE and the IFP, the DA is currently well positioned to
take advantage of the model. It won control of the Western Cape
provincial government from the ANC in 2009. Thus, unlike any of the
other opposition parties, it can use the next five years to develop a positive
provincial track record. Since 2006, the DA has also controlled the City of
Cape Town. The DA‘s president, Helen Zille, has received international
recognition for her governance of the City of Cape Town, particularly her
track record of dealing with corruption. 268 Since the 2009 election, Zille
has served as the Premier of the Western Cape.
The DA appears to be convinced that it can mount a successful
campaign against the ANC based on its subnational track records. The
DA‘s 2009 election campaign and its ongoing campaigns regarding the
upcoming 2010 local government election have relied heavily on Zille‘s
positive track record as the mayor of the City of Cape Town. The party‘s
current website has as one of its main taglines: ―DA: A Strong Track
Record in Government.‖269 The website provides a report card of DA
activities and policies in the City of Cape Town and other notable
municipalities.270 Perhaps most revealing of the DA‘s commitment to a
bottom-up opposition strategy is the fact that Zille did not go to the
National Assembly, but chose to remain in the Western Cape as Premier
following the 2009 election. As noted above, she is the first party
president to pass up a seat in the National Assembly for a position in
provincial government.

266. We rescued KZN, says Ndebele, IOL NEWS, Feb. 18, 2009, http://www.iol.co.za/news/
politics/we-rescued-kzn-says-ndebele-1.435007 (―When the ANC took over the reins from the IFP the
provincial government was in a near state of collapse. Sixty percent of schools had no power. Fifty
percent of schools used pit latrines while most had no toilets at all.‖).
267. This point is particularly important because ethnic loyalties in voting undermine Myerson‘s
model. The IFP drew its support from the Zulu people. However, it seems that these loyalties may be
softening since the IFP was removed from office. An alternative theory, however, is that Zulu loyalties
are not gone but divided. The ANC‘s president, Jacob Zuma, is Zulu.
268. See supra note 238.
269. See Democratic Alliance, http://www.da.org.za/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
270. See A Strong Track Record In Government, Democratic Alliance, http://www.da.org.za/
campaigns.htm?action=view-page&category=6592.
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It is obviously difficult to determine empirically whether the DA‘s
track record in the City of Cape Town caused its success in the 2009
Western Cape election. However, the DA has clearly adopted an
opposition strategy built around strong subnational track records. The
party seems to be staking its future on the viability of the model.
CONCLUSION
Federalism is not a panacea. It cannot cure all difficulties facing
emerging democracies. It can, however, play a significant role in fostering
political competition if certain legal parameters and political
circumstances are met. The ANC has dominated South African politics
since the country‘s first democratic election in 1994. Many citizens,
onlookers, and commentators sense that legitimate political competition is
necessary for South Africa‘s democracy to take the next step towards
consolidation. South Africa‘s federal regime presents opposition parties
with real opportunities to develop policy- and character-based track
records, and the DA has already taken advantage of these opportunities to
gain significant victories over the ANC in the Western Cape. What
remains to be seen is whether the model‘s formal logic will translate to
real and meaningful political competition between the DA and the ANC in
the 2014 national election.

